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Abstract 
This paper constructs a dynamic model of health insurance to evaluate the short- and long run 
effects of  policies that prevent firms from conditioning wages on health conditions of their 
workers, and that prevent health insurance companies from charging individuals with adverse 
health conditions higher insurance premia. Our study is motivated by recent US legislation that 
has tightened regulations on wage discrimination against workers with poorer health status 
(Americans with Disability Act of 2009, ADA, and ADA Amendments Act of 2008, ADAAA) and 
that will prohibit health insurance companies from charging different premiums for workers of 
different health status starting in 2014 (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, PPACA). In 
the model, a trade-off arises between the static gains from better insurance against poor health 
induced by these policies and their adverse dynamic incentive effects on household efforts to lead 
a healthy life. Using household panel data from the PSID we estimate and calibrate the model 
and then use it to evaluate the static and dynamic consequences of no-wage discrimination and 
no-prior conditions laws for the evolution of the cross-sectional health and consumption 
distribution of a cohort of households, as well as ex-ante lifetime utility of a typical member of this 
cohort. In our quantitative analysis we find that although a combination of both policies is effective 
in providing full consumption insurance period by period, it is suboptimal to introduce both policies 
jointly since such policy innovation induces a more rapid deterioration of the cohort health 
distribution over time. This is due to the fact that combination of both laws severely undermines 
the incentives to lead healthier lives. The resulting negative effects on health outcomes in society 
more than offset the static gains from better consumption insurance so that expected discounted 
lifetime utility is lower under both policies, relative to only implementing wage nondiscrimination 
legislation. 
 
JEL Classifications: E61, H31, I18 
Keywords:  Health, Insurance, Incentive Americans with Disabilities Act and its Amendment in 2009 sought to restrict the ability of employers to
employ and compensate workers diﬀerentially based upon health related reasons.
In order to analyze the impact of these policies we construct a dynamic model of health insurance
with heterogeneous households. As in Grossman (1972), health for these households is a state variable. A
household’s health state helps to determine both their productivity at work and the likelihood that they
will be subject to adverse health shocks. Our model features the two-way interaction between health and
income that has been emphasized in the literature. Our model of health shocks includes temporary health
shocks that impact on productivity and can be oﬀset by medical expenditures (as in Dey and Flinn 2005),
and catastrophic health shocks which require nondiscretionary health expenditures to avoid death. Health
status in our model is persistent and evolves stochastically. This evolution is aﬀected by the household’s
eﬀorts to maintain their health which results in a moral hazard problem as health related insurance reduces
households’ incentives to maintain their health. We explicitly model the choice of medical expenditure and
thereby endogenously determine the health insurance policy and how it responds both to the household’s
state in terms of health status, age and education.
The focus of our analysis is how the distributions of health status, earnings and health insurance costs will
evolve under diﬀerent policy choices and the impact of these choices on welfare. We consider several diﬀerent
policy regimes. The ﬁrst is a complete insurance benchmark in which the social planner can dictate both the
health insurance contract, the eﬀort made to maintain health and the extent of redistributive transfers that
provide full insurance against all health related shocks. The second is pure competition in which workers
enter into one-period employment and insurance contracts. Competition leads these contracts to partially
insure the worker against within period temporary health shocks, but not against his initial health status
and the transition of this status. The second is a version of the no-prior conditions restriction on health
insurance in which health insurance companies compete to oﬀer one-period health insurance contracts in
which they cannot diﬀerentially charge based upon the worker’s health status. The third is a version of the
no-discrimination restrictions on employment in which ﬁrms cannot diﬀerentially hire or pay workers based
upon their health status. In the fourth version we consider the impact of both the no-prior conditions and
the no-discrimination restrictions jointly.
We study both the static and the dynamic impact of these policies. One of the key aspects of the
dynamic analysis is the impact these policies have on individuals’ incentives to maintain their health and
the feedback this creates between the health distribution of the population and the costs of health insurance
and productivity of the workforce.
We evaluate the quantitative impacts of the diﬀerent policies on consumption insurance, incentives and
aggregate outcomes, and, ultimately, welfare. To do so, we ﬁrst estimate and calibrate the model using
PSID data to match key aggregate statistics on labor earnings, medical expenditures and observed physical
exercise levels. We then use the parameterized version of the model as a laboratory to evaluate diﬀerent
policy scenarios. Our results show that a combination of wage non-discrimination law and no prior conditions
law provides full insurance against health risks and restores the ﬁrst-best consumption insurance allocation
in the short run, but leads to a severe deterioration of incentives and thus the population health distribution
in the long run. Quantitatively evaluating the welfare consequences of this trade-oﬀ we ﬁnd that even though
both policies improve upon the laissez-faire equilibrium, implementing them jointly is suboptimal, relative
to introducing a wage nondiscrimination in isolation.
1.1 Institutional Background
The U.S. has a long history of policy initiatives in relation to health risk. Implicitly Welfare programs,
which date back to the 1930s and were greatly expanded by the Great Society in the 1960s, insure workers
against a variety of shocks, implicitly including health related shocks insofar they aﬀect earnings. Since
1965 Medicare has sought to provide health insurance to the elderly and the disabled. Medicaid has sought
to provide health insurance to the poor since the 1990s. The last two decades legislation in the U.S. was
passed that limits the ability of employers to condition wages on the health conditions of employees, and to
discriminate against applicants with prior health conditions when ﬁlling vacant positions.
21.1.1 Wage Based Discrimination
In 1990 Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to ensure that the disabled have equal
access to employment opportunities.1 At this point a disability was interpreted as an impairment that
prevents or severely restricts an individual from doing activities that are of central importance to one’s daily
life. In 2009 the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) went into eﬀect. This act rejected the strict interpretation
of the ADA, broadening the notion of a disability. This included prohibiting the consideration of measures
that reduce or mitigate the impact of a disability in determining whether someone is disabled. It also allowed
people who are discriminated against on the basis of a perceived disability to pursue a claim on the basis of
the ADA regardless of whether the perceived disability limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.
The ADAAA excludes from the deﬁnition of a disability those temporary or minor impairments.2 Under
the ADAAA people can be disabled even if their disability is episodic or in remission. For example people
whose cancer is remission or whose diabetes is controlled by medication, or whose seizures are prevented by
medication, or who can function at a high level with learning disabilities are all disabled under the act.
Before the ADA job seekers could be asked about their medical conditions and were often required to
submit to a medical exam. The act prohibited certain inquiries and conducting a medical exam before
making an employment oﬀer. However, the job could still be conditioned upon successful completion of a
medical exam.3
The ADA permits an employer to establish job-related qualiﬁcations on the basis of business necessity.
However, business necessity is limited to essential functions of the job. So impairments that would only
occasionally interfere with the employee’s ability to perform tasks cannot be included on this list.4 Aj o b
function is essential if the job exists to perform that function or if the limited number of employees available
at the ﬁrm requires that the task must be performed by this worker. Furthermore, a core requirement of the
ADA is the obligation of the employer to make a reasonable accommodation to qualiﬁed disabled people.5
1.1.2 Insurance Cost and Exclusion Discrimination
In 1996, Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) which placed
limits on the extent to which insurance companies could exclude people or deny coverage based upon pre-
existing conditions. Although insurance companies were allowed exclusions periods for coverage of pre-
existing conditions, these exclusion periods were reduced by the extent of prior insurance. In particular,
if an individual had at least a full year of prior health insurance and she enrolled in a new plan with a
break of less than 63 days, she could not be denied coverage. However, insurers were still allowed to charge
higher premiums based upon initial conditions, limit coverage and set lifetime limits on beneﬁts.6 There is
evidence that many patients with pre-existing conditions ended up either being denied coverage,7 or having
their access to beneﬁts limited.8
The Patient Protection and Aﬀordable Care Act of 2010 further extended protection against pre-existing
conditions. Beginning in 2010 children below the age of 19 could not be excluded from their parents’ health
insurance policy or denied treatment for pre-existing conditions. Beginning in 2014 this restriction will apply
to adults as well. Moreover, insurance companies will no longer be able to use health status to determine
eligibility, beneﬁts or premia. In addition, insurers will be prevented from limiting lifetime or annual beneﬁts
1The ADA sets the federal minimum standard of protection. States may have a more stringent level.
2Under the ADAAA major life activities now include: caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating,
sleeping, walking, standing , lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,
working, as well as major bodily functions.
3For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has ruled that an employee may be asked ”how
many days were you absent from work?”, but not ”how many days were you sick?”.
4For example, an employer cannot require a driver’s license for a clerking job because it would occasionally be useful to
have that employee run errands. Also qualiﬁcation cannot be such that a reasonable accommodation would allow the employee
to perform the task.
5These accommodations include: a) making existing facilities accessible and usable b) job restructuring c) part-time or
modiﬁed work schedules d) reassigning a disabled employee to a vacant position e) acquiring or modifying equipment or devices
f) providing qualiﬁed readers or interpreters.
6See http://www.healthcare.gov/center/reports/preexisting.html
7See Kass et al. (2007).
8See Sommers (2006).
3or from taking away coverage because of an application mistake.9
1.1.3 Summary
It is our interpretation of these legislative changes that, relative to 20 years ago, it is much more diﬃcult now
for employers to condition wages on the health status of their (potential) employees and preferentially hire
workers with better health. In addition, current and pending legislation will make it increasingly diﬃcult to
condition the acceptance into, and insurance premia of health insurance plans on prior health conditions.
The purpose of the remainder of this paper is to analyze the aggregate and distributional consequences
of these two legislative innovations in the short and in the long run, with speciﬁc focus on their interactions.
1.2 Related Literature
Our paper incorporates health as a productive factor, and studies the eﬀect of labor and health insurance
market policies on its evolution. We allow for a two-way interaction between health shocks and earnings
through worker productivity. We model medical expenditures which mitigate the impact of these health
shocks. There have been a number of studies that empirically estimate the eﬀect of health on wages. These
papers (see the summary in Currie and Madrian, 1999) generally ﬁnd that poor health decreases wages, both
directly and indirectly through a decrease in hours worked. The eﬀect of a health shock on wages ranges
from 1% to as high as 15%. Many studies consistently ﬁnd that the eﬀects on hours worked is greater than
that on wages. Speciﬁcally relevant for us is Cawley (2004).
Similarly to what we do for working age individuals, Pijoan-Mas and Rios-Rull (2012), use HRS data on
self-report health status to estimate a health transition function from age 50 onwards. They ﬁnd that there is
an important dependence in this transition function on socioeconomic status (most importantly education),
and that this dependence is quantitatively crucial for explaining longevity diﬀerentials by socioeconomic
groups. As we do Hai (2012) and Prados (2012) model the interaction between health and earnings over the
life cycle, but focus on the implications of their models for wage-, earnings- and health insurance inequality.10
A relatively small literature examines the incentive linkages between health insurance and health status.
Bhattacharya et al. (2009) use evidence from a Rand health insurance experiment, which featured random-
ized assignment to health insurance contracts, to show that access to health insurance leads to increases
in body mass and obesity. They argue that this comes from the fact that insurance, especially through its
pooling eﬀect, insulates people from the impact of their excess weight on their medical expenditure costs.
Consistent with this, they ﬁnd the impact of being health-insured is larger for public insurance programs
than in private ones in which the health insurance premium is more likely to reﬂect the individuals’ body
mass.
This paper contributes to the broad literature that examines the macroeconomic and distributional
implications of health, health insurance and health care policy reform. Important related contributions
include Grossman (1972), Ehrlich and Becker (1972), Ehrlich and Chuma (1990), French and Jones (2004),
Hall and Jones (2007), Jeske, and Kitao (2009), Jung and Tran (2010), Attanasio, Kitao and Violante (2011),
Ales, Hosseini and Jones (2012), Halliday, He and Zhang (2012), Hansen, Hsu and Lee (2012), Kopecky and
Koreshkova (2012), Laun (2012) and Ozkan (2012), Pashchenko and Porapakkam (2012). Br¨ ugemann and
Manovskii (2010), while endogenizing health, study the macroeconomic eﬀects of the employer-sponsored
health insurance system that is unique to the US labor market. Concretely, they determine the eﬀect of
PPACA on health insurance coverage, but do not study the incentive eﬀects of the regulation that we
formalize in our model.
Several papers investigate the impact of regulation designed to limit the direct eﬀect of health on both
health insurance costs and on wages. Short and Lair (1994) examine how health status interacts with
insurance choices. Madrian (1994) studies the lock-in eﬀect of employer provided health care. Dey and Flinn
(2005) estimate a model of health insurance with search, matching and bargaining and argue that employer
provided health care insurance leads to reasonably eﬃcient outcomes.
Related to our study of wage non-discrimination laws is the literature that studies the eﬀect of the ADA
legislation of 1990 on employment, wages and labor hours of the disabled (see DeLeire (2001) and Acemoglu
9See again http://www.healthcare.gov/center/reports/preexisting.html
10Both papers also study the impact of compulsary health insurance legislation.
4and Angrist (2001), for example). Most ﬁnd that it has decreased the employment of the disabled. DeLeire
(2001) quantiﬁes the eﬀect of ADA on wages of disabled workers and reports that the negative eﬀect of poor
health on the earnings of the disabled fell by 11.3% due to ADA.
Finally, a recent literature examines the impact of health on savings and portfolio choice in life cycle
models that share elements with our framework. These include Yogo (2009), Edwards (2008) and Hugonnier
et al. (2012). The latter study jointly portfolio of health and other asset choices. In their model health
increases productivity (labor income) and decreases occurrence of morbidity and mortality shock arrival
rates (as they do in our model). The paper argues that in order to explain the correlation between ﬁnancial
and health status, these should be modelled jointly.
2 The Model
Time t =0 ,1,2,...T is discrete and ﬁnite and the economy is populated by a cohort of a continuum of
individuals of mass 1. Since we are modeling a given cohort of individuals we will use time and the age of
households interchangeably. We think of T as the end of working life of the age cohort under study.
2.1 Endowments and Preferences
Households are endowed with one unit of time which they supply inelastically to the market. They are also
e n d o w e dw i t ha ni n i t i a ll e v e lo fh e a l t hh and we denote by H = {h1,...,h N} the ﬁnite set of possible health
levels. Households value current consumption c and dislike the eﬀort e that helps maintain their health. We
will assume that their preferences are additively separable over time, and that they discount the future at
time discount factor β. We will also assume that preferences are separable between consumption and eﬀort,
and that households value consumption according to the common period utility function u(c)a n dv a l u e
eﬀort according to the period disutility function q(e).
We will denote the probability distribution over the health status h at the beginning of period t by Φt(h),
and denote by Φ0(h) the initial distribution over this characteristic.
Assumption 1 The utility function u is twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. q is
twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, strictly convex, with q(0) = q (0) = 0 and lime→∞ q (e)=∞.
2.2 Technology
2.2.1 Health Technology
Let ε denote the current health shock.11 In every period households with current health h remain healthy
(that is, ε = 0) with probability g(h). With probability 1−g(h) the household draws a health shock ε ∈ (0, ¯ ε]
which is distributed according to the probability density function f(ε).
Assumption 2 f is continuous and g is twice diﬀerentiable with g(h) ∈ [0,1], and g (h) > 0,g  (h) < 0 for
all h ∈ H.
An individual’s health status evolves stochastically over time, according to the Markov transition function
Q(h ,h;e), where e ≥ 0 is the level of exercise by the individual. We impose the following assumption on
the Markov transition function Q
Assumption 3 If e  >ethen Q(h ,h;e) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Q(h ,h;e ).
11In the quantitative analysis we will introduce a second, fully insured (by assumption) health shock to provide a more
accurate map between our model and the health expenditure data.
52.2.2 Production Technology
A individual with health status h and current health shock ε that consumes health expenditures x produces
F(h,ε − x) units of output.
Assumption 4 F is continuously diﬀerentiable in both arguments, increasing in h, and satisﬁes F(h,y)=
F(h,0) for all y ≤ 0, and F2(h,y) < 0 as well as F2(h, ¯ ε) < −1. Finally F22(h,y) < 0 for all y>0 and
F12(h,y) ≥ 0.
The left panel of ﬁgure 1 displays the production function F(h,.), for two diﬀerent levels of the current
health shock. Holding health status h constant, output is decreasing in the uncured portion of the health
shock ε − x, and the decline is more rapid for lower levels of health (h∗ <h ). The right panel of ﬁgure 1
displays the production function as function of health expenditures x, for a ﬁxed level of the shock ε, and
shows that expenditures x exceeding the health shock ε leave output F(h,ε − x) unaﬀected (and thus are
suboptimal). Furthermore, a reduction of the shock ε to a lower level, ε∗, shifts the point at which health
expenditures x become ineﬀective to the left.
Figure 1: Production Function F(h,ε − x) Figure 2: Production Function F(h,ε − x)f o rﬁ x e dε
The assumptions on the production function F imply that health expenditures can oﬀset the impact of
a health shock on productivity, but not raise an individual’s productivity above what it would be if there
had been no shock. In addition, the last assumption on F that F12 ≥ 0 implies that the negative impact of
a given net health shock y is lower the healthier a person is.12 The assumption F2(h, ¯ ε) < −1 insures that,
if hit by the worst health shock the cost of treating this health shock, at the margin, is smaller than the
positive impact on productivity (output) this treatment has.
2.3 Time Line of Events
In the current period the timing of events is as follows
1. Households enter the period with current health status h.
2. Households choose e.
3. Firms oﬀer wage w(h) and health insurance contracts {x(ε,h),P(h)}13 to households with health status
h which these households accept.
12This is also the approach taken by Hugonnier et al. (2012) and Ehrlich and Chuma (1990).
13Since we restrict attention to static contracts, whether ﬁrm oﬀers contracts before or after the eﬀort is undertaken does
not matter.
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Figure 3: Timing of the Model
4. The health shock ε is drawn according to the distributions g,f.
5. Resources on health x = x(ε,h)a r es p e n t .
6. Production and consumption takes place.
7. The new health status h  of a household is drawn according to the health transition function Q.
2.4 Market Structure without Government
There are a large number of production ﬁrms that in each period compete for workers. Firms observe the
health status of a worker h and then, prior to the realization of the health shocks, compete for workers
of type h by oﬀering a wage w(h) that pools the risk of the health shocks and bundle the wage with an
associated health insurance contract (specifying health expenditures x(ε,h) and an insurance premium P(h))
that breaks even. Perfect competition for workers of type h requires that the combined wage and health
insurance contract maximize period utility of the household, subject to the ﬁrm breaking even.14
In the absence of government intervention a ﬁrm specializing on workers of health type h therefore oﬀers a
wage wCE(h)( w h e r eCE stands for competitive equilibrium) and health insurance contract (xCE(ε,h),PCE(h))
that solves
UCE(h)= m a x
w(h),x(ε,h),P(h)
u(w(h) − P(h)) (1)
s.t.
P(h)=g(h)x(0,h)+( 1− g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)x(ε,h)dε (2)
w(h)=g(h)F(h,−x(0,h)) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)F(h,ε − x(ε,h))dε (3)
Note that by bundling wages and health insurance the ﬁrm provides eﬃcient insurance against health shocks
ε, and the only source of risk remaining in the competitive equilibrium is health status risk associated with
14Note that instead of assuming that ﬁrms completely specialize by hiring only a speciﬁc health type of workers h we could
alternatively consider a market structure in which all ﬁrms are representative in terms of hiring workers of health types according
to the population distribution and pay workers of diﬀerent health h diﬀerential wages according to the schedule wCE(h). In
other words health variation in wages and variation in hired health types h are perfect substitutes at the level of the individual
ﬁrm in terms of supporting the competitive equilibrium allocation.
7h. This risk stems both from the dependence of wages w(h) as well as health insurance premia P(h)o n
h in the competitive equilibrium, and these are exactly the sources of consumption risk that government
policies preventing wage discrimination and prohibiting prior health conditions to aﬀect insurance premia
are designed to tackle.
2.5 Government Policies
We now describe in turn how we operationalize, within the context of our model, a policy that outlaws
health insurance premia to be conditioned on prior health conditions h, and a policy that limits the extent
to which ﬁrms can pay workers of varying health h diﬀerential wages.
2.5.1 No Prior Conditions Law
Under this law health insurance companies are assumed to be constrained in terms of their pricing, their
insurance schedule oﬀers and their applicant acceptance criteria. The purpose of these constraints is to
prevent the companies from diﬀerentially pricing insurance based upon health status.15 To be completely
successful, these constraints must lead to a pooling equilibrium in which all individuals are insured at the
same price. The best such regulation in addition assures that the equilibrium health insurance schedule
x(ε,h), given the constraints, is eﬃcient. We now describe the regulations suﬃcient to achieve this goal.
The ﬁrst constraint on health insurers is that a company must specify the total number of contracts
that it wishes to issue, it must charge a ﬁxed price independent of health status, and accept applications in
their order of application up to the sales limit of the company. In this way, the insurance company cannot
examine applications ﬁrst and then decide whether or not to oﬀer the applicant a health insurance contract.
The second constraint regulates the health expenditure schedule. If the no-prior conditions law is to have
any bite the government needs to prevent the emergence of a separating equilibrium in which the health
insurance companies (or the production ﬁrms in case they oﬀer health insurance contracts) use the health
expenditure schedule x(ε,h) to eﬀectively select the desired health types, given that they are barred from
conditioning the health insurance premium P on h directly. Therefore, to achieve any sort of pooling in the
health insurance market requires the government to regulate the health expenditure schedule x(ε,h). To give
the legislation the best chance of being successful we will assume that the government regulates the health
expenditure schedule x(ε,h) eﬃciently. For the same reason, since risk pooling is limited if some household
types h choose not to buy insurance, we assume that all individuals are forced to buy insurance.
Given this structure of regulation and a cross-sectional distribution of workers by health type, Φ, the
health insurance premium P charged by competitive ﬁrms (or competitive insurance companies, who oﬀer
health insurance in the model), given the set of regulations spelled out above, is determined by
P =
 
h
 
g(h)x(0,h)+( 1− g(h))
 
f(ε)x(ε,h)dε
 
Φ(h)( 4 )
where x(ε,h) is the expenditure schedule regulated by the government. This schedule is chosen to maximize
 
h
u(w(h) − P)Φ(h)
with wages w(h) determined by (3).
2.5.2 No Wage Discrimination Law
The objective of the government is to prevent workers with a lower health status h, and hence lower produc-
tivity, being paid less. As with the no prior conditions law, the purpose of this legislation is to help insure
workers against their health status risk. However, if a production ﬁrm is penalized for paying workers with
low health status h low wages, but not for preferentially hiring workers with a favorable health status (high
15Consistent with this restricted purpose, we will assume that the government cannot use health insurance to oﬀset underlying
diﬀerences in productivity coming from, say, education. This will prove important in the quantitative section.
8h), then a ﬁrm can eﬀectively circumvent the wage nondiscrimination law. Therefore, to be eﬀective such a
law must penalize both wage discrimination and hiring discrimination by health status.
Limiting wage dispersion with respect to gross wages w(h) via legislation necessitates regulation of the
health insurance market as well, in order to prevent the insurance gains from decreasing wage dispersion being
undone through the adjustment of employer-provided health insurance. For example, the ﬁrm could also
oﬀer health insurance and overcharge low productivity workers and undercharge high productivity workers
for this insurance, eﬀectively undermining the illegal wage discrimination. This suggests that the government
will need to limit the extent to which the cost of a worker’s health insurance contracts deviates from its
actuarially fair value. However, this will not be suﬃcient to make this policy eﬀective.
Since the productivity of a worker depends upon the extent of his health insurance, workers whose
expected productivity is below their wage will face pressure to increase their productivity through increased
spending on health (and hence better health insurance coverage) while those whose productivity is above
their wage will have an incentive to lower their health insurance purchases. To prevent these distortions in the
health insurance market and thereby achieve better consumption insurance across h types, policy makers will
need to regulate the health insurance directly as well. The moderate version of health insurance regulation
would be to ensure that each policy was individually optimal and actuarially fair. The most extreme version
of regulation would be to combine no-wage discrimination legislation with no-prior conditions legislation and
thereby achieve the static ﬁrst-best, full insurance outcome. In this case health insurance would be socially
eﬃcient and actuarially fair on average (that is, across the insured population).
We will analyze both cases. It will turn out that limiting wage dispersion with respect to net wages,
w(h) − P(h), avoids the negative incentive eﬀects on the health insurance market. The policy of combining
both no-wage discrimination and no-prior conditions can therefore be implemented through a policy of
limiting net wage dispersion. The impact of the nondiscrimination law will, unfortunately, be sensitive to
the way in which the law is implemented, and in particular, to the form of punishment used. If the limitation
in wage variation is achieved through a policy that penalizes the ﬁrms for discriminating, then these costs
are realized in equilibrium, reducing overall eﬃciency in the economy. If, however, the limitation on wage
variation is achieved either through the threat of punishment (e.g. through grim trigger strategies in repeated
interactions between ﬁrms and the government) or through the delegation of hiring in a union hiring hall
type arrangement, then costs from the wage nondiscrimination law will not be realized in equilibrium.16
Since we wish to give the no wage discrimination law the best shot of being successful, in the main text
we focus on the version of the policy in which no costs from the policy are realized in equilibrium, leaving
the analysis of the alternative case to appendix B.2 and B.3. In either case we only tackle the extreme
versions of these policies in which there is no wage discrimination (rather than limited wage discrimination)
in equilibrium for reasons of analytic tractability. Under the policy, the ﬁrm takes as given thresholds on
the size of the gap in wages or employment shares that will trigger the punishment. Assume that the wage
penalty will be imposed if the maximum wage gap within the ﬁrm exceeds the threshold εw. Since type
h = 0 will receive the lowest wage in equilibrium, to avoid the penalty a ﬁrm has to oﬀer a wage schedule
that satisﬁes:
max
h
|w(h) − w(0)|≤εw.
Letting n(h) denote the number of workers of type h hired by the ﬁrm, assume that the hiring penalty will
be imposed if the employment share of type h deviates from the population average by more than δ, and
hence  
 
   
n(h)
 
h n(h)
−
Φ(h)
 
h Φ(h)
 
   
  ≤ δ.
We will assume that the punishment is suﬃciently dire that the ﬁrm will never choose to violate these
thresholds.
We analyze the more general case in appendix B.1, but here focus on the limiting case in which the
thresholds εw and δ converge to zero. In this case, the ﬁrm will simply take as given the economy-wide wage
w∗ at which it can hire a representative worker. We assume that the government regulates the insurance
16The delegation method is similar to the structure we assumed in the insurance market since insurance companies were
restricted to serving their customers on a ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-serve basis. This assumption to us seems more problematic in the
labor market because of the idiosyncratic nature of the beneﬁts to the worker-ﬁrm match.
9market determining the extent of coverage by health type, x(e,h), subject to the requirement that the oﬀered
health insurance contracts exactly break even, either health type by health type (in the absence of a no prior
conditions law) or in expectation across health types (in the presence of the no prior conditions law).
Perfect competition drives down equilibrium proﬁts of ﬁrms to zero which determines the equilibrium
wage rate as
w∗ =
 
h
 
g(h)F(h,−x(0,h)) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)[F(h,ε − x(ε,h))]dε
 
Φ(h)( 5 )
The insurance premium charged to the household is
P(h)=g(h)x(0,h)+( 1− g(h))
 
f(ε)x(ε,h)dε (6)
in the absence of a no-prior conditions law and
P =
 
h
 
g(h)x(0,h)+( 1− g(h))
 
f(ε)x(ε,h)dε
 
Φ(h)( 7 )
in its presence. Household consumption is given by
c(h)=w∗ − P(h)o r
c = w∗ − P
depending on whether a no prior conditions law is in place or not.
Given a cross-sectional health distribution Φ the eﬃciently regulated health insurance contract x(ε,h)i s
the solution to
max
x
 
h
u(w∗ − P(h))Φ(h)
subject to (5) and (6) if the no-prior conditions restriction is not imposed on health insurance, and subject
to (7) instead of (6) if the no-prior conditions restriction is present.
We now turn to the analysis of the model, starting with a static version in which by construction the choice
of eﬀort is not distorted in equilibrium. We will show that in this case the competitive equilibrium implements
an eﬃcient allocation of health expenditures, but fails to provide eﬃcient consumption insurance against
prior health conditions, that is against cross-sectional variation in h. We then argue that a combination of a
strict wage non-discrimination law and a no prior conditions law in addition results in eﬃcient consumption
insurance in the competitive equilibrium, restoring full eﬃciency of allocations in the regulated market
economy.
3 Analysis of the Static Model
We now turn to the analysis of the static version of our model, and we will characterize both eﬃcient and
equilibrium allocations (in the absence and presence of the nondiscrimination policies). The purpose of
this analysis is two-fold. First, it will result in the characterization of the optimal and equilibrium health
insurance contract, a key ingredient for our dynamic model. Second, the analysis will demonstrate that in
the short run (that is statically) the combination of both policies is ideally suited to provide full consumption
insurance in the regulated market equilibrium, and thus restores full eﬃciency of the market outcome. The
static beneﬁts of these policies are then traded oﬀ against the adverse dynamic consequences on the health
distribution, as our analysis of the dynamic model will uncover in the next section.
3.1 Social Planner Problem
Given an initial cross-sectional distribution over health status in the population Φ(h) the social planner
maximizes utilitarian social welfare. The social planner problem is therefore given by
10USP(Φ) = max
e(h),x(ε,h),c(ε,h)≥0
 
h
 
−q(e(h)) + g(h)u(c(0,h)) + (1 − g(h))
 
f(ε)u(c(ε,h))dε
 
Φ(h)
subject to
 
h
 
g(h)c(0,h)+( 1− g(h))
 
f(ε)c(ε,h)dε + g(h)x(0,h)+( 1− g(h))
 
f(ε)x(ε,h)dε
 
Φ(h)
≤
 
h
 
g(h)F(h,−x(0,h)) + (1 − g(h))
 
f(ε)F(h,ε − x(ε,h))dε
 
Φ(h)
We summarize the optimal solution to the static social planner problem in the following proposition, whose
proof follows directly from the ﬁrst order conditions and assumption 4 (see Appendix A).
Proposition 5 The solution to the social planner problem {cSP(ε,h),x SP(ε,h),e SP(h)}h∈H is given by
eSP(h)=0
cSP(ε,h)=cSP
xSP(ε,h)=m a x
 
0,ε− ¯ εSP(h)
 
where the cutoﬀs satisfy
− F2(h, ¯ εSP(h)) = 1, (8)
and the ﬁrst best consumption level is given by
cSP =
 
h
 
g(h)F(h,0) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)
 
F(h,ε − xSP(ε,h)) − xSP(ε,h)
 
dε
 
Φ(h)( 9 )
The optimal cutoﬀ {¯ εSP(h)} is increasing in h, strictly so if F12(h,y) > 0.
The social planner ﬁnds it optimal to not have the household exercise (given that there are no dynamic
beneﬁts from doing so in the static model) and to provide full consumption insurance against adverse health
shocks ε, but also against bad prior health conditions as consumption is constant in h.
The optimal level of health expenditure and its implications on production is graphically presented in
Figure 4. As shown in the previous proposition, optimal medical expenditures take a simple cutoﬀ rule:
small health shocks ε<¯ εSP(h) are not treated at all, but all larger shocks are fully treated up to the
threshold ¯ εSP(h). These optimal medical expenditures are displayed in Figure 4(b) for two diﬀerent initial
levels of health h1 <h 2:b e l o wt h eh-speciﬁc threshold ¯ εSP(h) health expenditures are zero, and then rise
one for one with the health shock ε. The determination of the threshold itself is displayed in Figure 4(a). It
shows that under the assumption that the impact of health shocks on productivity is less severe for healthy
households (F12(h,y) > 0, reﬂected as a “more concave” curve for h1 than for h2 in Figure 4(a)), then
the social planner ﬁnds it optimal to “insure” healthier households less, in the sense of undoing less of the
negative health shocks ε through medical treatment x(ε,h). This is reﬂected in a lower threshold (more
insurance) for h1 than for h2, that is ¯ εSP(h2) < ¯ εSP(h1). The optimal health expenditure policy function
leads to a net of-health-treatment production function F(h,ε − xSP(ε,h)) as shown in Figure 4(c).
3.2 Competitive Equilibrium
As in the social planner problem there is no incentive for households to exercise in the static model, and
thus e(h)=0 . As described in section 2.4 the equilibrium wage and health insurance contract solves
UCE(h)= m a x
w(h),x(ε,h),P(h)
u(w(h) − P(h)) (10)
s.t.
P(h)=g(h)x(0,h)+( 1− g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)x(ε,h)dε (11)
w(h)=g(h)F(h,−x(0,h)) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)F(h,ε − x(ε,h))dε (12)
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(a) Production Function (b) Health Expenditure (c) Production
Figure 4: Optimal Health Expenditure and Production
The following proposition characterizes the solution to this problem:
Proposition 6 The unique equilibrium health insurance contract and associated consumption are given by
xCE(ε,h)=m a x
 
0,ε− ¯ εCE(h)
 
(13)
cCE(ε,h)=cCE(h)=wCE(h) − PCE(h) (14)
PCE(h)=( 1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
¯ εCE(h)
f(ε)
 
ε − ¯ εCE(h)
 
dε (15)
wCE(h)=g(h)F(h,0) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)F(h,ε − x(ε,h))dε (16)
and the cutoﬀ satisﬁes
− F2(h, ¯ εCE(h)) = 1 (17)
Proof. See Appendix
We immediately obtain the following
Corollary 7 The competitive equilibrium implements the socially eﬃcient health expenditure allocation since
¯ εCE(h)=¯ εSP(h) for all h ∈ H.
Corollary 8 The cutoﬀ ¯ εCE(h) is increasing in h, strictly so if F12(h,y) > 0.
While it follows trivially from our assumptions that the worker’s net pay, w(h) − P(h), is increasing
in h, it is not necessarily true that his gross wage, w(h), is increasing in h as well since optimal health
expenditures are decreasing in health status. We analyze the behavior of gross wages w(h) with respect to
health status further in Appendix C, where we provide a suﬃcient condition for the gross wage schedule to
be monotonically increasing in h.
In any case, the previous results show that in the static case the only source of ineﬃciency of the
competitive equilibrium comes from the ineﬃcient lack of consumption insurance against adverse prior health
12conditions h. This can be seen by noting that
cSP =
 
h
 
g(h)F(h,0) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)
 
F(h,ε − xSP(ε,h)) − xSP(ε,h)
 
dε
 
Φ(h)
=
 
h
 
wCE(h) − PCE(h)
 
Φ(h)=
 
h
cCE(h)Φ(h)
In contrast to what will be the case in the dynamic model, eﬀort trivially is not distorted in the equi-
librium, relative to the allocation the social planner implements (since in both cases eSP = eCE =0 ) .
Furthermore the equilibrium allocation of health expenditures is eﬃcient, due to the fact that the ﬁrm bun-
dles the determination of wages and the provision of health insurance, and thus internalizes the positive
eﬀects of health spending x(ε,h) on worker productivity.
Given these results it is plausible to expect, within the context of the static model, that policies preventing
competitive equilibrium wages wCE(h) to depend on health status (a wage non-discrimination law) and
insurance premia PCE(h) to depend on health status (a no prior conditions law) will restore full eﬃciency
of the policy-regulated competitive equilibrium by providing full consumption insurance. We will show next
that this is indeed the case, providing a normative justiﬁcation for the two policy interventions within the
static version of our model.
3.3 Competitive Equilibrium with a No Prior Condition Law
As discussed above, in order to eﬀectively implement a no prior conditions law the government has to regulate
the health insurance provision done by ﬁrms or insurance companies. Given a population health distribution
Φ the regulatory authority solves the problem:
UNP(Φ) = max
x(ε,h)
 
h
u(w(h) − P)Φ(h) (18)
s.t.
P =
 
h
 
g(h)x(0,h)+( 1− g(h))
 
f(ε)x(ε,h)dε
 
Φ(h) (19)
w(h)=g(h)F(h,−x(0,h)) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)F(h,ε − x(ε,h))dε (20)
The next proposition characterizes the resulting regulated equilibrium allocation
Proposition 9 The equilibrium health expenditures under a no-prior condition law satisﬁes, for each ˜ h ∈ H
xNP(ε,˜ h) = max[0,ε− ¯ εNP(˜ h)]
with cutoﬀs uniquely determined by
−F2(˜ h, ¯ εNP(˜ h)) =
 
h u (wNP(h) − PNP)Φ(h)
u (w(˜ h) − PNP)
.
The equilibrium wage, for each ˜ h, is given by
wNP(˜ h)=g(˜ h)F(˜ h,0) + (1 − g(˜ h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)[F(˜ h,ε − xNP(ε,˜ h))]dε
and the health insurance premium is determined as
PNP =
 
h
 
g(h)xNP(0,h)+( 1− g(h))
 
f(ε)xNP(ε,h)dε
 
Φ(h).
Moreover, the optimal cutoﬀs are increasing in health status.
13Proof. See Appendix.
Note that the health expenditure levels are no longer eﬃcient as the government provides partial con-
sumption insurance against initial health status when choosing the cutoﬀ levels ¯ εNP(h), in the absence of
direct insurance against low wages induced by bad health. In fact, as shown in the next proposition, it is
eﬃcient to over-insure households with bad health status and under-insure those with good health status,
relative to the ﬁrst-best.
Proposition 10 Let ˜ h be the health status whose marginal utility of consumption is equal to the population
average, i.e. for ˜ h,
− F2(˜ h, ¯ ε(˜ h)) =
 
h u (w(h) − P)Φ(h)
u (w(˜ h) − P)
= 1 (21)
holds.17 Then,
¯ εNP(h) < ¯ εSP(h), for h<˜ h
¯ εNP(h)=¯ εSP(h), for h = ˜ h
¯ εNP(h) > ¯ εSP(h), for h>˜ h,
The cutoﬀs ¯ ε(h) are strictly monotonically increasing in health status h.
Proof. See Appendix.
This feature of the optimal health expenditure with a no prior conditions law also indicates that manda-
tory participation in the health insurance contract is an important part of government regulation, since in
the allocation described above healthy households cross-subsidize the unhealthy in terms of insurance premia
and they are given a less generous health expenditure plan (higher thresholds) than the unhealthy.
3.4 Competitive Equilibrium with a No Wage Discrimination Law
The equilibrium with a no wage discrimination law is determined by the solution to the program:
UND(Φ) = max
x(ε,h)
 
h
u(w − P(h))Φ(h) (22)
s.t.
P(h)=
 
g(h)x(0,h)+( 1− g(h))
 
f(ε)x(ε,h)dε
 
w =
 
h
 
g(h)F(h,−x(0,h)) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)F(h,ε − x(ε,h))dε
 
Φ(h)
Proposition 11 The equilibrium health expenditures under a no-wage discrimination law alone satisﬁes,
for each ˜ h ∈ H
xND(ε,˜ h)=m a x
 
0,ε− ¯ εND(˜ h)
 
with cutoﬀs determined by
−F2(˜ h, ¯ εND(˜ h)) =
u (wND − P(˜ h))
 
h u (wND − P(h))Φ(h)
.
The equilibrium wage is given by
wND =
 
h
 
g(h)[F(h,0 ) ]+( 1− g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)
 
F(h,ε − xND(ε,h))
 
dε
 
Φ(h)
and the health insurance premium is given by, for each ˜ h,
PND(˜ h)=
 
g(˜ h)xND(0,˜ h)+( 1− g(˜ h))
 
f(ε)xND(ε,˜ h)dε
 
.
17For the purpose of the proposition it does not matter whether ˜ h ∈ H or not.
14Proof. Follows directly from the ﬁrst order conditions of the program (22).
Unlike in the no prior conditions case, we cannot establish monotonicity in the cutoﬀs ¯ εND(˜ h). Note that
under a no prior conditions law the regulatory authority partially insures consumption of the unhealthy by
allocating higher medical expenditure to them. Under a no wage discrimination law instead, there are two
opposing forces, preventing us from establishing monotonicity in cutoﬀs ¯ εND(h) across health groups h.O n
one hand, a one unit increase in medical expenditure P(h) is more costly to the unhealthy since marginal
utility of consumption is higher for this group. On the other hand, production eﬃciency calls for higher
medical expenditure for the unhealthy, given our assumption of F12 ≥ 0 (as was the case for the no prior
conditions law). Thus the cutoﬀs ¯ εND(h) need not be monotone in h.
3.5 Competitive Equilibrium with Both Policies
Finally, combining both a no-wage discrimination law and a no-prior conditions legislation restores eﬃciency
of the regulated equilibrium since both policies in conjunction provide full consumption insurance against
bad health realizations h. This is the content of the next.
Corollary 12 The unique competitive equilibrium allocation in the presence of both a no wage discrimination
and a no prior conditions law implements the socially eﬃcient allocation in the static model.
Proof. The equilibrium is the solution to
max
x(ε,h)
 
h
u(w∗ − P)Φ(h)
s.t.
P =
 
h
 
g(h)x(0,h)+( 1− g(h))
 
f(ε)x(ε,h)dε
 
Φ(h)
w∗ =
 
h
 
g(h)F(h,−x(0,h)) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)F(h,ε − x(ε,h))dε
 
Φ(h).
The result then follows trivially from the fact that this maximization problem is equivalent to the social
planner problem analyzed above. The no prior conditions law equalizes health insurance premia P across
health types, the no wage discrimination law implements a common wage w∗ across health types, and the
(assumed) eﬃcient regulation of the health insurance market assures that the health expenditure schedule
is eﬃcient as well.
3.6 Summary of the Analysis of the Static Model
The competitive equilibrium implements the eﬃcient health expenditure allocation but does not insure
households against initial health conditions. Both a no-prior conditions law and a no-wage discrimination
law provide partial, but not complete, consumption insurance against this risk, without distorting the eﬀort
level. The health expenditure schedule is distorted when each policy is implemented in isolation, relative
to the social optimum, as the government provides additional partial consumption insurance through health
expenditures. Only both laws in conjunction implement a fully eﬃcient health expenditure schedule and full
consumption insurance against initial health conditions h, and therefore restore the ﬁrst best allocation in
the static model. Enacting both policies jointly is thus fully successful in what they are designed to achieve
in a static world (partially due to the fact that additional government regulation severely restricted the
options of ﬁrms to circumvent the government policies).
4 Analysis of the Dynamic Model
We now study a dynamic version of our economy. Both in terms of casting the problem, as well as in terms of
its computation we make use of the fact that there is no aggregate risk (due to the continuum of agents cum
law of large numbers assumption). Therefore the sequence of cross-sectional health distributions {Φt}T
t=0
15is a deterministic sequence. Furthermore, conditional on a distribution Φt today the health distribution
tomorrow is completely determined by the eﬀort choice et(h) of households18 (or the social planner), so that
we can write
Φt+1 = H(Φt;et(.)) (23)
where the time-invariant function H is in turn completely determined by the Markov transition function
Q(h ;h,e). The initial distribution Φ0 is an initial condition and exogenously given.
Under each policy, given a sequence of aggregate distributions {Φt}T
t=0 we can solve an appropriate
dynamic maximization problem of an individual household for the sequence of optimal eﬀort decisions
{et(h)h∈H}T
t=0 which in turn imply a new sequence of aggregate distributions via (23). Our computational
algorithm for solving competitive equilibria then amounts to iterating on the sequences {Φt,e t}. Within each
period the timing of events follows exactly that of the static problem in the previous section.
4.1 Social Planner Problem
The dynamic problem of the social planner is to solve
V (Φ0)= m a x
{et(h)}
T  
t=0
βt
 
USP(Φt) −
 
h
q(et(h))Φt(h)
 
where {Φt+1} is determined by equation (23) and
USP(Φ) = max
x(ε,h),c(ε,h)
 
h
 
g(h)u(c(0,h)) + (1 − g(h))
 
f(ε)u(c(ε,h))dε
 
Φ(h)
= u(cSP(Φ))
is the solution to the static social planner problem characterized in section 3.1:
xSP(ε,h)=m a x
 
0,ε− ¯ εSP(h)
 
with cutoﬀs deﬁned by
− F2(h, ¯ εSP(h)) = 1 (24)
and consumption of each household given by
cSP(Φ) =
 
h
 
g(h)F(h,0) + (1 − g(h))
 
ε
f(ε)
 
F(h,ε − xSP(ε,h)) − xSP(ε,h)
 
dε
 
Φ(h).
We now want to characterize the optimal eﬀort choice by the social planner, the key dynamic decision in
our model both in the planner problem and the competitive equilibrium. In contrast to households in the
competitive equilibrium, the social planner fully takes into account the eﬀect of eﬀort choices today on the
aggregate health distribution and thus aggregate consumption tomorrow.
A semi-recursive formulation of the problem is useful to characterize the optimal eﬀort choice, but also to
explain the computational algorithm for the social planner problem. For a given cross-sectional distribution
Φt at the beginning of period t the social planner solves:
Vt(Φt)=u(ct)+ m a x
et(h)h∈H,
 
−
 
h
q(et(h))Φt(h)+βVt+1(Φt+1)
 
s.t. ct = cSP(Φt)
Φt+1(h )=
 
h
Q(h ;h,et(h))Φ(h) (25)
18We assert here that the optimal eﬀort in period t is only a function of the current individual health status h. We will
discuss below the assumptions required to make this assertion correct.
16In appendix D we discuss how we solve this problem numerically, iterating on sequences {ct,e t(h),Φt(h)}T
t=0
from the terminal condition VT(ΦT)=u(cT). To characterize the optimal eﬀort choice, for an arbitrary time
period t we obtain the ﬁrst order condition:
q (et(h))Φt(h)=β
 
h 
∂Vt+1(Φt+1)
∂Φt+1(h )
·
∂Φt+1(h )
∂et(h)
= β
 
h 
∂Vt+1(Φt+1)
∂Φt+1(h )
·
∂Q(h ;h,et(h))
∂et(h)
Φt(h),
This simpliﬁes to
q (et(h)) = β
 
h 
∂Vt+1(Φt+1)
∂Φt+1(h )
·
∂Q(h ;h,et(h))
∂et(h)
. (26)
Thus the marginal cost of extra eﬀort q (et(h)) is equated to the marginal beneﬁt, the latter being given
by the the beneﬁt that eﬀort has on the health distribution tomorrow,
∂Q(h
 ;h,et(h))
∂et(h) , times the beneﬁt of
a better health distribution
∂Vt+1(Φt+1)
∂Φt+1(h ) from tomorrow on. By assumption 1, q (0) = 0, and assumption 3
guarantees that the right hand side of equation (26) is strictly positive. Therefore the social planner ﬁnds it
optimal to make every household exert positive eﬀort to lead a healthy life: et(h) > 0 for all t and all h ∈ H.
From the envelope theorem the beneﬁt of a better health distribution is given by:
∂Vt(Φt)
∂Φt(h)
= u (ct) · Ψ(h) − q(et(h)) + β
 
h 
∂Vt+1(Φt+1)
∂Φt+1(h )
· Q(h ;h,et(h)). (27)
Here Ψ(h) denotes the expected output, net of health expenditures, that an individual of health status h
delivers to the social planner.19
4.2 Competitive Equilibrium without Policy
In our model, since absent wage and health insurance policies households do not interact in any way, we can
solve the dynamic programming problem of each household independently of the rest of society. The only
state variables of the household are her current health h and age t, and the dynamic program reads as:
vt(h)=UCE(h)+m a x
et(h)
 
−q(et(h)) + β
 
h 
Q(h ;h,et(h))vt+1(h )
 
(28)
where
UCE(h)= m a x
x(ε,h),w(h),P(h)
u(w(h) − P(h))
s.t.
w(h)=g(h)F(h,−x(0,h)) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)F(h,ε − x(ε,h))dε
P(h)=g(h)x(0,h)+( 1− g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)x(ε,h)dε
19Note that
Ψ(h)=

g(h)F(h,0) + (1 − g(h))

ε
f(ε)

F(h,ε − xSP(ε,h)) − xSP(ε,h)

dε

is exclusively determined by the optimal cut-oﬀ rule ¯ εSP(h) for health expenditures, which is independent of ct or Φt.
17is the solution to the static equilibrium problem in section 3.2, which was given by:
xCE(ε,h)=m a x
 
0,ε− ¯ εCE(h)
 
cCE(h)=wCE(h) − PCE(h)
PCE(h)=( 1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
¯ εCE(h)
f(ε)
 
ε − ¯ εCE(h)
 
dε
wCE(h)=g(h)F(h,0) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)F(h,ε − x(ε,h))dε
with cutoﬀ:
−F2(h, ¯ εCE(h)) = 1
Note again that the provision of health insurance is socially eﬃcient in the competitive equilibrium.
In contrast to the social planner problem, and in contrast to what will be the case in a competitive
equilibrium with a no-wage discrimination law or a no-prior conditions law, in the unregulated competitive
equilibrium there is no interaction between the maximization problems of individual households. Thus the
dynamic household maximization problem can be solved independent of the evolution of the cross-sectional
health distribution. It is a simple dynamic programming problem with terminal value function
vT(h)=UCE(h)
and can be solved by straightforward backward iteration.
Given the solution {et(h)} of the household dynamic programming problem and given an initial distri-
bution Φ0 the dynamics of the health distribution is then determined by the aggregate law of motion (23).
The optimal choice et(h) solves the ﬁrst order condition
q (et(h)) = β
 
h 
∂Q(h ;h,et(h))
∂et(h)
vt+1(h ) (29)
N o t et h a ta tt i m et when the decision et(h) is taken the function vt+1(.) is known. Furthermore, given
knowledge of vt+1 and the optimal et the period t value function vt is determined by (28). As in the social
planner problem, by assumptions 1 and 3 eﬀort et(h) is positive for all t and h.
4.3 Competitive Equilibrium with a No Prior Condition Law
As discussed above, we assume that the government in every period t takes as given the health distribution
Φt and enforces the no prior condition law and regulates health insurance contracts eﬃciently, as in the
static analysis of section 3.3. We now make explicit that the solution of the static government regulation
problem (18)-(20) is a function of the cross-sectional health distribution,
xNP(ε,˜ h;Φ t) = max[0,ε− ¯ εNP(˜ h;Φ t)] (30)
with cutoﬀs for each ˜ h ∈ H determined by
− F2(˜ h, ¯ εNP(˜ h;Φ t))u (wNP(˜ h;Φ t) − PNP(Φt)) =
 
h
u (wNP(h;Φ t) − PNP(Φt))Φt(h): =Eu (Φt) (31)
and
wNP(h;Φ t)=g(h)F(h,0) + (1 − g(h))
 
f(ε)[F(h,ε − xNP(ε,h;Φ t))]dε (32)
PNP(Φt)=
 
h
 
g(h)xNP(0,h;Φ t)+( 1− g(h))
 
f(ε)xNP(ε,h;Φ)dε
 
Φt(h) (33)
18In order for the household to solve her dynamic programming problem she only needs to know the
sequence of wages and health insurance premia {wt(h),P t}, but not necessarily the sequence of distributions
that led to it. Given such a sequence the dynamic programming problem of the household then reads as
vt(h)=u(wt(h) − Pt)+m a x
et(h)
 
−q(et(h)) + β
 
h 
Q(h ;h,et(h))vt+1(h )
 
(34)
with terminal condition vT(h)=u(wT(h) − PT). As before the optimality condition reads as
q (et(h)) = β
 
h 
∂Q(h ;h,et(h))
∂et(h)
vt+1(h ). (35)
and thus equates the marginal cost of providing eﬀort, q (e) with the marginal beneﬁt of an improved
health distribution tomorrow. Although equation (35) looks identical to equation (29) from the unregulated
equilibrium, the determination of the value functions that appear on the right hand side of both equations
is not (compare the ﬁrst terms on the right hand sides of equations (28) and (34)). The diﬀerence in these
equations highlights the extra consumption insurance induced by the no-prior conditions law, in that with
this policy the health insurance premium does not vary with h. This extra consumption insurance, ceteris
paribus, reduces the variation of vt+1 in h  and thus limits the incentives to exert eﬀort in order to achieve
a (stochastically) higher health level tomorrow. In appendix E we describe a computational algorithm to
solve the dynamic model with a no-prior conditions law.
4.4 Competitive Equilibrium with a No Wage Discrimination Law
The main diﬀerence to the previous section is that now the static health insurance contract and premium
are given by health spending
xND(ε,˜ h;Φ t) = max[0,ε− ¯ εND(˜ h;Φ t)] (36)
with cutoﬀs for each ˜ h ∈ H determined by
− F2(h, ¯ εND(h))Eu 
t = u (wND(Φt) − PND(h,Φt)) (37)
where
Eu 
t :=
 
h
u (wND(Φt) − PND(h,Φt))Φt(h). (38)
The equilibrium wage is given by
wND(Φt)=
 
h
 
g(h)F(h,0) + (1 − g(h))
 
f(ε)[F(h,ε − xND(ε,h;Φ t))]dε
 
Φt(h). (39)
The equilibrium health insurance premium depends on whether a no prior conditions law is in place or not:
Without such policy the premia are given as
PND(h;Φ t)=PND(h)=( 1− g(h))
 
f(ε)xND(ε,h)dε (40)
whereas with both policies in place the premium is determined by20
PBoth(Φt)=
 
h
 
(1 − g(h))
 
f(ε)xBoth(ε,h)dε
 
Φt(h) (41)
For a given sequence of wages {wt,P t(h)} the dynamic problem of the household reads as before:
vt(h)=u(wt − Pt(h)) + max
et(h)
 
−q(et(h)) + β
 
h 
Q(h ;h,et(h))vt+1(h )
 
(42)
and the terminal condition vT(h)=u(wT −PT(h)), ﬁrst order conditions and updating of the value function
for this version of the model are exactly the same, mutatis mutandis, as under the previous policy. In
appendix E we discuss the algorithm to solve this version of the model.
20Wages still take the form as in (39), but with xBoth(ε,h) replacing xND(ε,h). Recall from the static analysis that
xBoth(ε,h)=xSP(ε,h), that is, the medical expenditure schedule is socially eﬃcient.
194.5 Competitive Equilibrium with Both Laws
If both policies are in place simultaneously, we can give a full analytical characterization of the equilibrium
without resorting to any numerical solution procedure. We do so in the next
Proposition 13 Suppose there is a no wage discrimination and a no prior condition law in place simulta-
neously. Then
et(h)=0for all h, and all t.
The provision of health insurance is socially eﬃcient. From the initial distribution Φ0 the health distribution
in society evolves according to (23) with et(h) ≡ 0.
The proof is by straightforward backward induction and is given in Appendix A. In the presence of both
policies there are no incentives, either through wages or health insurance premia, to exert eﬀort to lead
a healthy life. Since eﬀort is costly, households won’t provide any such eﬀort in the regulated dynamic
competitive equilibrium. Thus in the absence of any direct utility beneﬁts of better health the combination
of both policies leads to a complete collapse in incentives, with the associated adverse long run consequences
for the distribution of health in society.
Equipped with these theoretical results and the numerical algorithms to solve the various versions of
our model we now map our model to cross-sectional health and exercise data from the PSID to quantify
the eﬀects of government regulations on the evolution of the cross-sectional health distribution, as well as
aggregate production, consumption and health expenditures.
5 Bringing the Model to the Data
5.1 Augmenting the Model
The model described so far only included the necessary elements to highlight the key static insurance-
dynamic incentive trade-oﬀ we want to emphasize. However, to insure that the model can capture the
signiﬁcant heterogeneity in health, exercise and health expenditure data observed in micro data we now
augment it in four aspects. We want to stress, however, that none of the qualitative results derived so far
rely on the absence of these elements, which is why we abstracted from them in our theoretical analysis.
First, in the data some households have health expenditures in a given year from catastrophic illnesses
that exceed their labor earnings. In the model, the only beneﬁt of spending resources on health is to oﬀset
the negative productivity consequences of the adverse health shocks ε. Thus it is never optimal to incur
health expenditures that exceed the value of a worker’s production in a given period. In order to capture
these large medical expenditures in data and arrive at realistic magnitudes of health insurance premia we
introduce a second health shock. This exogenous shock z stands in for a catastrophic health expenditure
shock, and when households receive the z-shock, they have to spend z; otherwise, they die (or equivalently,
incur a prohibitively large utility cost). Households in the augmented model are assumed to either not
receive any health shock, face either a z-shock, or an ε-shock, but not both. We denote by μz(h)t h em e a n
of the health expenditure shock z, conditional on initial health h, and by κ(h) the probability of receiving
a positive z-shock. Households that received a z-shock can still work, but at a reduced productivity ρ<1
relative to healthy workers. As described in more detail in appendix F.1, the z-shock merely scales up health
insurance premia by μz(h) and introduces additional health-related wage risk (since z-shocks come with a
loss of 1 − ρ of labor productivity).
Second, in our model so far all variation in wages was due to either health (h and ε − x) or age t. When
bringing the model to the data we permit earnings in the model to also depend on the education educ of
a household, and consequently specify the production function as F(t,educ,h,ε − x). Given this extension
we have to take a stance on how households of diﬀerent education levels interact in equilibrium under each
policy. Since our objective is to highlight the insurance aspect of both policies with respect to health-
related consumption risks we assume that even in the presence of a wage discrimination law individuals with
higher education can be paid more, and that health insurance companies can charge diﬀerential premia to
individuals with heterogeneous education levels even in the presence of a no-prior conditions law.
20Third, for the model to have a change of generating the observed heterogeneity in exercise levels of
individuals that are identical in terms of their age, health and education levels we introduce preference
shocks to the disutility from eﬀort. Instead of being given by q(e), as in the theoretical analysis so far,
the cost of exerting eﬀort is now assumed to be given as γq(e), where γ ∈ Γ is an individual-speciﬁc
preference shock that is drawn from the ﬁnite set Γ at the beginning of life and remains constant during
the individual’s life cycle.21 Note that since γ only aﬀects the disutility of eﬀort which is separable from
the utility of consumption, the analysis of the static model in section 3 remains completely unchanged (and
so do the optimal health insurance contracts and health expenditure allocations). In the analysis of the
dynamic model, since γ is a permanent shock, all expressions involving q(.)t u r ni n t oγq(.) but the analysis is
otherwise unaltered. Under the maintained assumption that wages and insurance premia are allowed to diﬀer
across diﬀerent γ-groups even in the presence of the laws (an assumption that parallels the one made in the
previous paragraph) there is no interaction between the diﬀerent (γ,educ) types and equilibrium allocations
under all policies can be solved for each (γ,educ) pair separately.22 These assumptions again highlight the
role of (γ,educ)-heterogeneity modeled here: it is not the focal point of our insurance vs. incentives analysis,
but rather allows us to capture some of the heterogeneity in outcomes in the data and thus avoids attributing
all of this observed heterogeneity to health diﬀerences. Ignoring these other sources of heterogeneity would
quantitatively overstate likely both the insurance beneﬁts as well as the incentive costs of the policies we
analyze in this paper. Consistent with the introduction of preference and skill (education) heterogeneity the
initial distribution over household types is now denoted by Φ0(h,γ,educ) and will be determined from the
data (but exploiting predictions of the structural model).
The last, and perhaps most signiﬁcant departure from the theoretical model is that we now endow the
household with a health-dependent continuation utility vT+1(h) from retirement. The theoretical model
implicitly assumed that this continuation utility was identically equal to zero, independent of the health
status at retirement. The vector vT+1(h) will be determined as part of our structural model estimation.
Endowing individuals with nontrivial continuation utility at retirement avoids the counterfactual prediction
of the model that eﬀort is zero in the last period of working life, T. This assumption also introduces a direct
utility beneﬁt from better health (albeit one that materializes at retirement) and thus avoids the complete
collapse of incentives to provide eﬀort under both policies (that is, proposition 13 no longer applies).
In the rest of this section, we use the so extended version of our model to estimate parameters to match
PSID data on health, expenditure and exercise in 1999. In the main body of the paper, we describe the
procedure we follow in a condensed form, relegating the detailed data description and estimation procedures
to the Appendix F. Once the model is parameterized and its reasonable ﬁt of the data established, in section
6 we then use it to analyze the positive and normative short- and long-run consequences of introducing
non-discrimination legislation.
5.2 Parameter Estimation and Calibration
The determination of the model parameters proceeds in three steps. First, we ﬁx a small subset of parameters
exogenously. Second, parts of the model parameters can be estimated from the PSID data directly. These
include the parameters governing the health transition function Q(h |h,e), the probabilities (g(h),κ(h)) of
receiving the ε and z health shocks, as well as the productivity eﬀect of the z-shocks given by ρ. Third,
(and given the parameters obtained in step 1 and 2) the remaining parameters (mainly those governing the
production function F, the ε-shock distribution f(ε) and preferences) are then determined through a method
of moments estimation of the model with PSID wage, health and eﬀort data. We now describe these three
steps in greater detail.
21It does not matter whether ﬁrms/health insurance companies observe a worker’s preference parameter γ since they engage
only in short-term contracts and since h is observable (γ only aﬀects eﬀort and ﬁrms as well as health insurance companies do
not care how the individual’s health evolves due to the restriction of attention to short-term contracts).
22In order to obtain a meaningful welfare comparison with socially optimal allocations we also solve the social planner
problem separately for each (γ,educ) combination, therefore ruling out ex ante social insurance against bad initial (γ,educ)
draws.
215.2.1 A Priori Chosen Parameters
First, we choose one model period to be six years, a compromise between assuring that eﬀort has a noticeable
eﬀect on health transitions (which requires a suﬃciently long time period) and reasonable sample sizes
for estimation (which speaks for short time periods). We then select two preference parameters a priori.
Consistent with values commonly used in the quantitative macroeconomics literature we choose a risk aversion
parameter of σ = 2 and a time discount factor of β =0 .96 per annum.
5.2.2 Parameters Estimated Directly from the Data
In a second step we estimate part of the model parameters directly from the data, without having to rely on
the equilibrium of the model.
Health Transition Function Q(h |h,e) The PSID includes measures of light and heavy exercise levels23
starting in 1999 which we use to estimate health transition functions. We denote by el and eh the frequency of
light and heavy exercise levels, and assume the following parametric functional form for the health transition
function:
Q(h ;h,el,e h)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(1 + π(h,el,e h)αi(h))G(h,h ), if h  = h + i,i ∈{ 1,2}
(1 + π(h,el,e h))G(h,h ), if h  = h,h > 1o rh  = h +1 ,h=1
⎛
⎜ ⎜
⎝
1 −
 
h ≥h
Q(h ;h,el,e h)
 
h <h
G(h,h )
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠G(h,h ), if h  = h − 1,h>1o rh  = h,h =1
where
π(h,el,e h)=φ(h)(δel +( 1− δ)eh)λ(h).
Since light and heavy physical exercise can have diﬀerent eﬀects on health transition, we give weight δ on
light exercise, and (1 − δ) on heavy exercise. We think of δel +( 1− δ)eh as the composite exercise level e
used in the theoretical analysis of our model.
Health Shock Probabilities g(h) and κ(h) In our model, g(h) represents the probability of not receiving
any shock, and κ(h) is the probability of facing a z-shock. Since we assume that households do not receive
both an ε-shock and a z-shock in the same period, the probability of facing an ε-shock is given by 1 −
g(h) − κ(h). From PSID, we ﬁrst construct the probabilities of having a z-shock and an ε-shock. We deﬁne
households that have received a z-shock as those who were diagnosed with cancer, a heart attack, or a
heart disease24 and those who spent more on medical expenditures than their current income when hit with
a health shock. Households with all other health shocks or those who missed work due to an illness are
categorized as having received an ε-shock.
Impact ρ of a z-shock on Productivity Using the criterion for determining ε and z-shocks speciﬁed
above, we use mean earnings of those with a z-shock relative to those without any health shock to directly
estimate ρ.
5.2.3 Parameters Calibrated within the Model
In a ﬁnal step we now use our model to ﬁnd parameters governing the production function, the ε-a n dz-shock
distribution, the distribution of preference parameters for exercise, and the terminal value function vT+1(h ).
23Number of times an individual carries out light physical activity (walking, dancing, gardening, golﬁng, bowling, etc.) and
heavy physical activity (heavy housework, aerobics, running, swimming, or bicycling).
24These three diseases lead to the most mean medical expenditures, relative to other health conditions reported in the data.
22The structure of our model allows us to calibrate the parameters in two separate steps. The ﬁrst part of the
estimation consists of ﬁnding parameters for the production function and distribution of health shocks, and
only involves the static part of the model from section 3. This is the case since realized wages and health
expenditures in the model are determined in the static part and are independent of eﬀort decisions and the
associated health evolution in the dynamic part of the model. In a second step we then employ the dynamic
part of the model to estimate the preference distribution for exercise and the terminal value of health.25
Production Function and Health Status We assume the following parametric form for the production
technology:
F(t,educ,h,ε − x)=A(t,educ)h +
(k − (ε − x))φ(a,educ)
hξ(a,educ) , 0 <φ (·),ξ(·) < 1,A(·) > 0.
The production function captures two eﬀects of health on production: the direct eﬀect (ﬁrst term) and the
indirect eﬀect which induces the marginal beneﬁt of health expenditures x to decline with better health
(that is −F12 < 0). The term A(t,educ) allows for heterogeneity in age and education of the eﬀect of
health on production and thus wages. Here age can take seven values, t ∈{ 1,2,...,7} and we classify
individuals into two education groups, those that have graduated from high school and those that have
not: educ ∈{ less than High School, High School Grad}. We also allow for diﬀerences in marginal eﬀects
of medical expenditures on production across education and two broad age groups through parameters
φ(a,educ)a n dξ(a,educ), where a ∈{ Young,Old}. We deﬁne Young as those individuals between the ages
of 24 and 41 and the rest as Old. This age classiﬁcation divides our sample roughly in half. We represent
the functions A(t,educ),φ(a,educ)a n dξ(a,educ) by a full set of age and education dummies.
Since in the unregulated equilibrium the production of individuals (after health expenditures have been
made) equals their labor earnings, we use data on labor earnings of households with diﬀerent health status  
w(h2)
w(h1)
,
w(h3)
w(h1)
,
w(h4)
w(h1)
 
as well as relative average earnings of the Young and the Old to pin down the
health levels {h1,h 2,h 3,h 4} in the model.26 Moreover, since A(t,educ) captures the eﬀects of age t and
education educ on labor earnings we use conditional (on age and education) earnings to pin down the 14
(7 × 2) parameters A(t,educ).
In order to determine the values of the dummies representing φ(·)a n dξ(·) we recognize that in the model
they determine the expenditure cutoﬀs for the ε-shock, as a function of individual health status. Thus we use
medical expenditure data to estimate these parameters. More speciﬁcally the four parameters representing
φ(a,educ) are determined to ﬁt the percentage of labor earnings spent on medical expenditure (averaged
over h) for each (a,educ)-group and the four parameters representing ξ(a,educ) are chosen to match the
percentage of labor earnings spent on medical expenditures (averaged over (a,educ) groups) for each level
h ∈ H of household health.27
Distribution of Health Shocks In order to estimate the parameters governing the distribution of health
shocks ε we exploit the theoretical result from section 3 that medical expenditures on these shocks is linear in
the shock: x∗(ε,h)=m a x {0,ε− ¯ ε(h)}. Thus the distribution of medical expenditures x coincides with that
of the shocks themselves, above the endogenous health-speciﬁc threshold ¯ ε(h). French and Jones (2004) argue
that the cross-sectional distribution of health care costs28 can best be ﬁtted by a log-normal distribution
(truncated at the upper tail). We therefore assume that the health shocks ε follow a truncated log-normal
25Even though we describe the parameters and calibration targets of the diﬀerent model elements in separate subsections
below for expositional clarity, the parameters for production function and health shock distributions are calibrated jointly,
using the targets in these sections. Similarly, the parameters for exercise preference distribution and marginal value of health
at terminal date are calibrated jointly, using the observations in both subsections.
26The categories {Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair} used in the data itself have no cardinal interpretation.
27Since there is more variation in the data for labor earnings than by health spending by age we decided to use a ﬁner age
grouping when estimating A(t,educ) using wage data than when estimating ξ(a,educ) and φ(a,educ) using health (expenditure)
data.
28They use HRS and AHEAD data. Health care costs include health insurance premia, drug costs and costs for hospital,
nursing home care, doctor visits, dental visits and outpatient care.
23distribution:
f(ε;με,σ ε,ε, ¯ ε)=
1
 σεφ
 
lnε−με
σε
 
Φ
 
ln ¯ ε−με
σε
 
− Φ
 
lnε−με
σε
 
where φ and Φ are standard normal pdf and cdf. We then choose the mean and standard deviation (με,σ ε)
of the shocks such that the endogenously determined mean and standard deviation of medical expenditures
in the model matches the mean and standard deviation of health expenditures for those with ε-shocks from
the data.
For the catastrophic health shock z, apart from the probability of receiving it (which was determined in
section 5.2.2), only the mean expenditures μz(h) matter. We use the percentage of labor income spent on
catastrophic medical expenditures, conditional on health status h, to determine these.
Distribution of Exercise Preference Parameters With estimates of the production function and
health shock distributions in hand we now calibrate the preference for exercise distribution, using the dynamic
part of the model. We assume that the eﬀort utility cost function takes the form
γq(e)=γ
 
1
1 − e
− (1 + e)
 
.
The functional form for q guarantees that q  (e) > 0, that q(0) = q (0) = 0 and that lime→1 q (e)=∞.
We assume that for each education group the preference shock γ can take two (education-speciﬁc) values,
γ ∈{ γ1(educ),γ 2(educ)}. We treat these values (4 in total) as parameters. The initial joint distribution Φ0
over types (h,educ,γ) is then determined by the eight numbers Φ0(γ1|educ,h) that give the fraction of low
cost (γ1) individuals for each of the eight (educ,h)-combinations. Thus we have to a total of 12 parameters
determining preference heterogeneity in the model. We choose the initial distribution Φ0(γ1|educ,h)s o
that model eﬀort levels match mean eﬀort levels in period 1 (ages 24-29), conditional on health (4 targets)
and conditional on education (2 targets), and mean eﬀort levels in period 7 (ages 60-65), conditional on
education (2 targets) in the data. To pin down the four values γ(educ), we use the aggregate mean and
standard deviation of eﬀort in period 1, and the measure of households with fair and excellent health in the
last period, t =7 .
Marginal Value of Health at Terminal Date As discussed above, absent direct beneﬁts from better
health upon retirement households in the model have no incentive to exert eﬀort, whereas in the data we
still see a signiﬁcant amount of exercise for those of ages 60 to 65. By introducing a terminal and health
dependent continuation utility vT+1(h) this problem can be rectiﬁed. Given the structure of the model and
the parametric form of the health transition function Q(h |h,e) only the diﬀerences in the continuation values
Δi = vT+1(hi) − vT+1(hi−1), for i =2 ,3,4
matter for the choice of optimal eﬀort in the last period T. We choose the Δ2,Δ3,Δ4 such that the model
reproduces the health-contingent average eﬀort levels of the 60 to 65 year olds, for h2,h 3,h 4.
The data targets and associated model parameters are summarized in Tables 9 and 10. The estimated
parameter values are reported in Table 11, together with their performance in matching the empirical cali-
bration targets.
5.3 Model Fit
Our model is fairly richly parameterized (especially along the production function/labor earnings dimension).
It is therefore not surprising that it ﬁts life cycle earnings proﬁles well. We have also targeted eﬀort levels
for very young and very old households (the latter by health status), but have not used data on h-speciﬁc
eﬀort levels (apart from at the ﬁnal pre-retirement age) in the estimation. How well the model captures the
age-eﬀort dynamics is therefore an important “test” of the model. Figures 5 (for mean eﬀort) and 27- 30
in appendix G.1 (for eﬀort by health status) plot the evolution of eﬀort (exercise) over the life cycle both
in the data and in the model. The dotted lines show the one-standard deviation conﬁdence bands. From
24Figure 5 we see that our model ﬁts the average exercise level over the life cycle very well, and Figures 27-
30 show the same to be true for eﬀort conditional on Very Good and Excellent health. For households with
Fair and Good health the model ﬁt is not quite as good as that for the Very Good and the Excellent health
groups, but still within the one-standard deviation conﬁdence bands (which are arguably quite wide though,
on account of smaller samples once conditioning both on age and health).29
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Figure 5: Average Eﬀort in Model and Data
6 Results of the Policy Experiments: Insurance, Incentives and
Welfare
After having established that the model provides a good approximation to the data for the late 1990’s and
early 2000’s in the absence of non-discrimination policies, we now use it to answer the main counterfac-
tual question of this paper, namely, what are the eﬀects of introducing these policies (one at a time and
in conjunction) on aggregate health, consumption and eﬀort, their distribution, and ultimately, on social
welfare.
The primary beneﬁt of the non-discrimination policies is to provide consumption insurance against bad
health, resulting in lower wages and higher insurance premia in the competitive equilibrium. However, these
policies weaken incentives to exert eﬀort to lead a healthy life, and thus worsen the long run distribution
of health, aggregate productivity and thus consumption. In the next two subsections, we present the key
quantitative indicators measuring this trade-oﬀ: ﬁrst, the insurance beneﬁts of policies, and second, the
adverse incentive eﬀects on aggregate production and health. Then, in subsection 6.3, we display the welfare
consequences of our policy reforms. In the main text we focus on weighted averages of the aggregate
variables and welfare measures across workers of diﬀerent (educ,γ)-types, and document the disaggregated
results (which are qualitatively, and to a great extent, quantitatively similar to the averaged numbers) in
appendix G.2.
6.1 Insurance Beneﬁts of Policies
Turning ﬁrst to the consumption insurance beneﬁts of both policies, we observe from ﬁgure 6 that the
combination of both policies is indeed eﬀective in providing perfect consumption insurance. As in the social
planner problem, within-group consumption dispersion, as measured by the coeﬃcient of variation, is zero
for all periods over the life cycle if both a no-prior conditions law and a no-wage discrimination law are
in place (the lines for the social planner solution and the equilibrium under both policies lie on top of one
29For Fair and Good health, our model predicts higher exercise level between the ages of 30 and 54 than in the data. This
is partly due to a composition eﬀect: in the second period of life, many workers with low disutility for exercise have fair health
and exercise a lot, leading to an increase in the average exercise level for the fair health group. One mechanical way of rectifying
this problem would be to let the values the taste parameter γ can take on vary with age, reﬂecting diﬀerences in taste for
exercise at diﬀerent stages of life.
25another and are identically equal to zero).30 This is of course what the theoretical analysis in sections 3 and
4 predicted. Also notice from ﬁgure 6 that a wage non-discrimination law alone goes a long way towards
providing eﬀective consumption insurance, since the eﬀect of diﬀerences in health levels on wage dispersion
is signiﬁcantly larger than the corresponding dispersion in health insurance premia. Thus, although a no-
prior conditions law in isolation provides some consumption insurance and reduces within-group consumption
dispersion by about 30%, relative to the unregulated equilibrium, the remaining health-induced consumption
risk remains signiﬁcant.
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Figure 6: Consumption Dispersion
Another measure of the insurance beneﬁts provided by the non-discrimination policies is the level of cross-
subsidization or implicit transfers: workers do not necessarily pay their own competitive (actuarially fair)
price of the health insurance premium or/and they are not fully compensated for their productivity. Under
no-prior conditions policy, as established theoretically in Proposition 10, the healthy workers subsidize the
premium of the unhealthy. Similarly, wages of the unhealthy workers are subsidized by the healthy, productive
workers under the no-wage discrimination policy. Moreover, under both policies, there is cross-subsidization
in both health insurance premia and wages.
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Figure 7: Cross Subsidy: Excellent Health
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Figure 8: Cross Subsidy: Fair Health
Figures 7 and 8 plot the degree of cross-subsidization over the life cycle, both for households with excellent
and those with fair health, and Table 13 in appendix G.2 summarizes the transfers for all health groups. The
30Due to the presence of heterogeneity in education levels and preferences the economy as a whole displays non-trivial
consumption dispersion even in the presence of both policies (as it does in the solution of the restricted social planner problem).
26plots for the health insurance premium measures the diﬀerences between the actuarially fair health insurance
premium a particular health type household would have to pay and the actual premium paid in the presence
of either a no-prior conditions policy or the presence of both policies. Similarly, the wage plots display the
diﬀerence between the productivity of the worker (and thus her wage in the unregulated equilibrium) and
the wage received under a no-wage discrimination policy and in the presence of both policies. Negative
numbers imply that the worker is paying a higher premium, or is paid lower wage than in a competitive
equilibrium without government intervention. Thus such a worker, in the presence of government policies,
has to transfer resources to workers of diﬀerent (lower) health types. Reversely, positive numbers imply that
a worker is being subsidized, i.e., she is paying a lower premium and is paid higher wage.
We observe from Figure 7 that the workers with excellent health signiﬁcantly cross-subsidize the other
workers, both in terms of cross-subsidies in health insurance premia as well as in terms of wage transfers.
To interpret the numbers quantitatively, note that average consumption of the excellent group is 1.04 when
young and 1.75 when aged 42-47. Thus the wage transfers delivered by this group amount to 12 − 14% of
average consumption when young and close to 30% in prime working age (note that the share of workers
in excellent health in the population has shrunk at that age, relative to when this cohort of workers was
younger). From ﬁgure 7 we also observe that the implicit transfers induced by a no-prior conditions law are
still signiﬁcant (they amount to 3-7% of consumption for young workers of excellent health, and 4-10% when
middle-aged), but quantitatively smaller than those implied by wage-nondiscrimination legislation.
Figure 8 displays the same plots for households of fair health. These households are the primary recipients
of the transfers from workers with excellent health,31 and for this group (which is small early in the life
cycle but grows over time) the transfers are massive. In terms of their average competitive equilibrium
consumption, the implicit health insurance premium subsidies amount to a massive 37-60% and the wage
transfers amount to a staggering 65-75% of pre-policy average consumption of this group. Although these
transfers shrink (as a fraction of pre-policy consumption) over the life cycle as the share of households with
fair health increases and that with excellent health declines, they continue to account for a signiﬁcant part
of consumption for households of fair health. These numbers indicate that the insurance beneﬁts from both
policies, and speciﬁcally from the wage nondiscrimination law, will be substantial.
An interesting property of the subsidies is that the level of subsidization implied by a given policy is
higher when only one of the non-discrimination laws is enacted, relative to when both policies are present.
This is especially true for the no-prior conditions law and is due to the fact that the government insures the
workers with bad health through an ineﬃcient level of medical expenditure.
Thus far, we have discussed the insurance beneﬁts of the non-discrimination policies. In the next sub-
section, we analyze the aggregate dynamic eﬀects of the policies on production and the health distribution.
6.2 Adverse Incentive Eﬀects on Aggregate Production and Health
The associated incentive costs from each policy are inversely proportional to their consumption insurance
beneﬁts, as ﬁgure 9 shows. In this ﬁgure we plot the average exerted eﬀort over the life cycle, in the socially
optimal and the equilibrium allocations under the various policy scenarios. In a nutshell, eﬀort is highest
in the solution to the social planner problem, positive under all policies,32 but substantially lower in the
presence of the non-discrimination laws.
More precisely, two important observations emerge from ﬁgure 9. First, the policies that provide the
most signiﬁcant consumption insurance beneﬁts also lead to the most signiﬁcant reductions in incentives
to lead a healthy life. It is the very dispersion of consumption due to health diﬀerences, stemming from
health-dependent wages and insurance premia that induce workers to provide eﬀort in the ﬁrst place, and
thus the policies that reduce that consumption dispersion the most come with the sharpest reduction in
31Table 13 in the appendix shows that households with very good health are also called upon to deliver transfers, albeit
of much smaller magnitude, and workers with good health are on the receiving side of (small) transfers. As the cohort ages
the share of households in these diﬀerent health groups shifts, and towards the end of the life cycle the now larger group of
households with fair health receives subsidies from all other households, at least with respect to health insurance premia.
32Recall that, relative to the theoretical analysis, we have introduced a terminal value of health which induces not only
eﬀort in the last period even under both policies, but through the continuation values in the dynamic programming problem,
positive eﬀort in all periods. How quantitatively important this eﬀect is for younger households depends signiﬁcantly on the
time discount factor β.
27incentives. Whereas a no-prior conditions law alone leads to only a modest reduction of eﬀort, with a wage
nondiscrimination law in place the amount of exercise household ﬁnd optimal to carry out shrinks more
signiﬁcantly. Finally, if both policies are implemented simultaneously the only beneﬁt from exercise is a
better distribution of post-retirement continuation utility, and thus eﬀort plummets strongly, relative to the
competitive equilibrium.
The second observation we make from ﬁgure 9 is that the impact of the policies on eﬀort is most signiﬁcant
at young and middle ages, whereas towards retirement eﬀort levels under all polices converge. This is owed
to the fact that the direct utility beneﬁts from better health materialize at retirement and are independent of
the nondiscrimination laws (but heavily discounted by our impatient households), whereas the productivity
and health insurance premium costs from worse health accrue through the entire working life and are strongly
aﬀected by the diﬀerent policies.33
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Figure 9: Eﬀort
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Figure 10: Average Health
Given the dynamics of eﬀort over the life cycle (and a policy invariant initial health distribution), the
evolution of the health distribution is exclusively determined by the health transition function Q(h ;h,e).
Figure 10 which displays average health in the economy under the various policy scenarios is then a direct
consequence of the eﬀort dynamics from Figure 9. It shows that health deteriorates under all policies as a
cohort ages, but more rapidly if a no-prior conditions law and especially if a wage nondiscrimination law is
in place. As with eﬀort, the conjunction of both policies has the most severe impact on public health.
Figure 12 demonstrates that the decline of health levels over the life cycle also induce higher expenditures
on health (insurance) later in life. The level of these expenditures (and thus their relative magnitudes across
diﬀerent policies) are determined by two factors, a) the health distribution (which evolves diﬀerently under
alternative policy scenarios) and b) the equilibrium health expenditures, which are fully determined by the
thresholds ¯ ε(h) from the static analysis of the model and that vary across policies. The evolution of health
is summarized by ﬁgure 10, and ﬁgure 11 displays the health dependent thresholds ¯ ε(h) for the youngest
households.34 Recall from section 3 that the thresholds ¯ ε(h) under the unregulated competitive equilibrium
and the equilibrium with both policies are socially eﬃcient and thus the three graphs completely overlap.
Also observe that, relative to the eﬃcient allocation (=unregulated equilibrium) under the no-prior conditions
law workers with low health are strongly over-insured (they have lower thresholds, ¯ εNP(hi) > ¯ εSP(hi)f o r
i =1 ,2) and workers with very good and excellent health are slightly under-insured. This was the content of
Proposition 10, and it is quantitatively responsible for the ﬁnding that health expenditures are highest under
this policy. The reverse is true under a no-wage discrimination law: low health types are under-insured and
high types are over-insured, relative to the social optimum, but quantitatively these diﬀerences are minor.
Finally, ﬁgures 13 and 14 display aggregate production and aggregate consumption over the life cycle.
Since the productivity of each worker depends on her health and on the non-treated fraction of her health
33In fact, absent the terminal (and policy invariant) direct beneﬁts from better health the diﬀerences in eﬀort levels across
policies remain fairly constant over the life cycle.
34The ﬁgures are qualitatively similar for older cohorts.
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Figure 12: Health Spending
shock, aggregate output is lower, ceteris paribus, under policy conﬁgurations that lead to a worse health
distribution and that leave a larger share of health shocks ε untreated. From ﬁgure 13 we observe that the
deterioration of health under a policy environment that includes a wage nondiscrimination policy is especially
severe, in line with the ﬁndings from ﬁgure 10. Interestingly, the more generous health insurance (for those
of fair and good health) under a no-prior conditions law alone leads to output that even exceeds that in
the unregulated equilibrium, despite the fact that the health distribution under that policy is (moderately)
worse. But health expenditures of course command resources that take away from private consumption,
and as ﬁgure 14 shows, resulting aggregate consumption over the life cycle under this policy is substantively
identical to that under the wage discrimination law (and the consumption allocation is more risky under the
no-prior conditions legislation). Relative to the unregulated equilibrium both policies thus entail a signiﬁcant
loss of average consumption in society (in one case, because less is produced, in the other case because more
resources are spent on productivity enhancing health goods); the same is even more true if both policies are
introduced jointly.
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Figure 13: Production
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Figure 14: Consumption
Overall, the eﬀect on aggregate eﬀort, health, production and thus consumption suggests a quantitatively
important trade-oﬀ between consumption insurance and incentives. Within the spectrum of all policies, the
unregulated equilibrium provides strong incentives at the expense of risky consumption, whereas a policy mix
that includes both policies provides full insurance at the expense of a deterioration of the health distribution.
The eﬀects of the no-prior conditions law on both consumption insurance and incentives are modest, relative
29to the unregulated equilibrium. In contrast, implementing a no wage discrimination law or both policies
insures away most of the consumption risk, but signiﬁcantly reduces (although does not eliminate completely)
the incentives to exert eﬀort to lead a healthy life, especially early in the life cycle. In the next subsection
we will now document how these two quantitatively sizable but countervailing eﬀects translate into welfare
consequences from hypothetical policy reforms.
6.3 Welfare Implications
In this section we quantify the welfare impact of the policy innovations studied in this paper. For a ﬁxed
initial distribution Φ0(h) over health status,35 denote by W(c,e) the expected lifetime utility of a cohort
member (where expectations are taken prior to the initial draw h of health) from an arbitrary allocation
of consumption and eﬀort over the life cycle.36 Our consumption-equivalent measure of the welfare conse-
quences of a policy reform is given by
W(cCE(1 + CEV i),e CE)=W(ci,e i)
where i ∈{ SP,NP,NW,Both} denotes the policy scenario under consideration. Thus CEV i is the per-
centage reduction of consumption in the competitive equilibrium consumption allocation required to make
households indiﬀerent (ex ante) between the competitive equilibrium allocation37 and that arising under
policy regime i.
In order to emphasize the importance of the dynamic analysis in assessing the normative consequences
of diﬀerent policies we also report the welfare implications of the same policy reforms in the static version of
the model in section 3. Similar to the dynamic consequences we compute the static consumption-equivalent
loss (relative to the competitive equilibrium) as
U(cCE(1 + SCEV i)) = U(ci)
where U(c) is the expected utility from the period 0 consumption allocation38, under the cross-sectional
distribution Φ0, and thus is determined by the static version of the model.39 Therefore SCEV i provides a
clean measure of the static gains from better consumption insurance induced by the policies against which
the dynamic adverse incentive eﬀects have to be traded oﬀ.
The static welfare consequences reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 1 that isolate the consumption
insurance beneﬁts of the policies under consideration are consistent with the consumption dispersion dis-
played in Figure 6. Perfect consumption insurance, as implemented in the solution to the social planner
problem and also achieved if both policies are implemented jointly, are worth close to 6% of unregulated
equilibrium consumption. Each policy in isolation delivers a substantial share of these gains, with the no
wage discrimination law being more eﬀective than the no-prior conditions law.
35Recall that we carry out our analysis for each (educ,γ)-type separately and report averages across these types. Thus in
what follows Φ0 suppresses the (policy-independent) dependence of the initial distribution on (educ,γ).
36That is, using the notation from section 4, for the socially optimal allocation
W(cSP,e SP)=V (Φ0)
and for equilibrium allocations, under policy i,
W(ci,e i)=

vi
0(h)dΦ0.
37Recall that even the social planner problem is solved for each speciﬁc (γ,educ) group separately and thus also does not
permit ex-ante insurance against unfavorable (γ,educ)-draws. We consider this restricted social planner problem because we
view the results are better comparable to the competitive equilibrium allocations.
38In the static version of the model eﬀort is identically equal to zero in the social planner problem and in the equilibrium
under all policy speciﬁcations, and therefore disutility from eﬀort is irrelevant in the static version of the model.
39Thus, using the notation from section 3
U(cCE)=UCE(Φ0)f o ri ∈{ SP,NP,NW ,Both}
and
U(cCE)=

UCE(h)dΦ0.
30Static CEV i Dynamic CEV i
Social Planner 5.6527 16.4799
Competitive Equilibrium 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior Conditions Law 4.1593 6.9782
No Wage Discrimination Law 5.3486 9.5399
Both Policies 5.6527 8.1656
Table 1: Aggregate Welfare Comparisons
Turning now to the main object of interest, the dynamic welfare consequences (column 2 of Table 1) paint
a somewhat diﬀerent picture. Consistent with the static analysis, both policies improve on the laissez-faire
equilibrium, and the welfare gains are substantial, ranging from 6% to 9.5% of lifetime consumption. The
sources of these welfare gains are improved consumption insurance (as in the static model) and reduced eﬀort
(which bears utility costs), which outweigh the reduction in average consumption these policies entail (recall
Figure 14). Furthermore, as in the static model a wage nondiscrimination law dominates a no-prior conditions
law. In light of Figures 14 and 6 this does not come as a surprise: both policies imply virtually the same
aggregate consumption dynamics, but the no-prior conditions law provides substantially less consumption
insurance.
But what we really want to stress is that there are crucial diﬀerences to the static analysis. First
and foremost, it is not optimal to introduce a no-prior conditions law once a wage non-discrimination
law is already in place. The latter policy already provides eﬀective (albeit not complete) consumption
insurance, and the further reduction of incentives and associated mean consumption implied by the no prior
conditions law makes a combination of both policies suboptimal. The associated welfare losses of pushing
social insurance too far amount to about 1.3% of lifetime consumption.40 Finally we see that in contrast
to the static case the best policy combination (a wage nondiscrimination law alone) does not come close to
providing welfare as high as the social optimum: the gap between these two scenarios turns out to about
7% of lifetime consumption. This gap is due to ineﬃciently little consumption insurance, ineﬃciently low
aggregate consumption and an ineﬃcient health expenditure allocation (see again Figure 11), although the
latter eﬀect is quantitatively modest. This eﬀect is however quantitatively crucial in explaining why the no-
prior conditions law in isolations fares worse than the wage nondiscrimination policies (and a combination
of both policies, which restores eﬃciency in health expenditures, recall proposition 12).
Fair Good Very Good Excellent
Social Planner 56.5681 13.7796 14.4002 10.5597
Competitive Equilibrium 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior Conditions Law 36.3452 7.9579 4.2954 0.5892
No Wage Discrimination Law 45.8741 14.4826 6.6942 -1.8221
Both Policies 54.2835 13.2129 5.0420 -4.4532
Table 2: Welfare Comparison in the Dynamic Economy Conditional on Health
The welfare consequences reported in Table 1 were measured under the veil of ignorance, before workers
learn their initial health level. They mask very substantial heterogeneity in how workers feel about these
policies once their initial health status in period 0 has been revealed. Given the transfers across health types
displayed in Figures 7 and 8 and the persistence of health status this is hardly surprising. Table 2 quantiﬁes
this heterogeneity by reporting dynamic consumption-equivalent variation measures, computed exactly as
before, but now computed after the initial health status has been materialized. Broadly speaking, the lower
a worker’s initial health status, the more she favors policies providing consumption insurance. For the middle
two health groups the ranking of policies coincides with that in the second column of Table 1; households
with excellent health prefer only the no prior conditions law (and thus only very moderate implicit transfers)
to the unregulated equilibrium, whereas young households with fair health would support the simultaneous
40It should be stressed that these conclusions follow under the maintained assumption that a wage nondiscrimination law is
indeed fully successful in curbing health-related wage variation, and does so completely costlessly.
31introduction of both policies. The diﬀerences in the preference for diﬀerent policy scenarios across diﬀerent
h-households are quantitatively very large: whereas fair-health types would be willing to pay 54% of laissez
faire lifetime consumption to see both policies introduced, households of excellent health would be prepared
to give up 4.5% of lifetime consumption to prevent exactly this policy innovation.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the eﬀect of labor and health insurance market regulations on evolution of health
and production, as well as welfare. We showed that both a no-wage discrimination law (an intervention in the
labor market), in combination with a no-prior conditions law (an intervention in the health insurance market)
provides eﬀective consumption insurance against health shocks, holding the aggregate health distribution in
society constant. However, the dynamic incentive costs and their impact on health and medical expenditures
of both policies, if implemented jointly, are large. Even though both policies improve upon the laissez-faire
equilibrium, implementing them jointly is suboptimal (relative to introducing a wage nondiscrimination in
isolation). We therefore conclude that a complete policy analysis of health insurance reforms on one side
and labor market (non-discrimination policy) reforms cannot be conducted separately, since their interaction
might prove less favorable despite welfare gains from each policy separately.
These conclusions rest in part on our assumption that both policies can be implemented optimally
at no direct overhead cost. To us, this assumption seems potentially more problematic for the no-wage
discrimination policy than the no-prior conditions policy because match-speciﬁcity between a worker and
a ﬁrm appears to be more important than between a worker and a health insurance company. One can
likely implement the no-prior conditions policy through the health insurance exchanges proposed by Obama
Care in which a government agency links those seeking health insurance to health insurance providers and
thereby overcomes, at low cost, the incentives of the health insurance companies to cherry-pick their clients.
However, a similar institution (e.g. something akin to a union hall type institution), is likely to demand
higher costs, given the speciﬁcity in most worker-ﬁrm matches. In addition, the average output produced
by a worker-ﬁrm pair is much larger than the expenses involved in health insurance (both in our model as
well as in the data).41
Finally, our analysis of health insurance and incentives over the working life has ignored several potentially
important avenues through which health and consumption risk aﬀect welfare. First, the beneﬁts of health in
our model are conﬁned to higher labor productivity, and thus we model the investment motives into health
explicitly. It has abstracted from an explicit modeling of the beneﬁts better health has on survival risk,
although the positive eﬀect of health h on the continuation utility after retirement partially captures this
eﬀect in our model, albeit in a fairly reduced from. Similarly, better health might have a direct eﬀect on ﬂow
utility during working life.42 Finally, in our analysis labor income risk directly translates into consumption
risk, in the absence of household private saving. We conjecture that the introduction of self-insurance via
precautionary saving against this income risk further weakens the argument in favor of the policies studied
in this paper. Future work has to uncover whether such an extension of the model also aﬀects, quantitatively
or even qualitatively, our conclusions about the relative desirability of these policies.
41To put these potential costs in perspective, from our quantitative results it follows that if as little as 3% of production
was consumed in implementing the no-wage discrimination policy (and the no prior conditions policy is cost-free), then it is
the latter policy that would constitute the ex ante preferred policy option.
42As we argue in appendix H at least in one extension of the model introducing a direct ﬂow utility beneﬁt from better
health leaves our analysis qualitatively unchanged.
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34A Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 5
Proof. Since exercise does not carry any beneﬁts in the static model, trivially eSP =0 . Attaching Lagrange
multiplier μ ≥ 0 to the resource constraint, the ﬁrst order condition with respect to consumption c(ε)i s
u (c(ε,h)) = λ
and thus cSP(ε,h)=cSP for all ε ∈ E and h ∈ H. Thus, not surprisingly, the social planner provides full
consumption insurance to households. The optimal health expenditure allocation maximizes this consump-
tion
cSP =m a x
x(ε,h)
 
h
 
g(h)[F(h,−x(0,h)) − x(0,h) ]+( 1− g(h))
 
f(ε)[F(h,ε − x(ε,h)) − x(ε,h)]dε
 
Φ(h)
Denoting by μ(ε,h) ≥ 0 the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint x(ε,h) ≥ 0, the ﬁrst order condition
with respect to x(ε,h)r e a d sa s
−F2(h,ε − x(ε,h)) + μ(ε,h)=1
Fix h ∈ H. By assumption 4 F22(h,y) < 0 and thus either x(ε,h)=0o rx(ε,h) > 0 satisfying
−F2(h,ε − x(ε,h)) = 1
for all ε. Thus oﬀ corners ε − x(ε,h)=¯ εSP(h) where the threshold satisﬁes
− F2(h, ¯ εSP(h)) = 1. (43)
Consequently
xSP(ε,h)=m a x
 
0,ε− ¯ εSP(h)
 
.
The fact that ¯ εSP(h) is increasing in h, strictly so if F12(h,y) > 0, follows directly from assumption 4 and
(43).
Proposition 6
Proof. Attaching Lagrange multiplier μ(h) to equation (11) and λ(h) to equations (12) the ﬁrst order
conditions read as
u (w(h) − P(h)) = λ(h)=−μ(h) (44)
λ(h)F2(h,−x(0,h)) ≤ μ(h) (45)
=i f x(0,h) > 0
λ(h)F2(h,ε − x(ε,h)) ≤ μ(h) (46)
=i f x(ε,h) > 0
Thus oﬀ corners we have
F2(h, ˆ ε − x(ˆ ε,h)) = F2(h,ε − x(ε,h)) = K (47)
for some constant K. Thus oﬀ corners ε − x(ε,h) is constant in ε and thus medical expenditures satisfy the
cutoﬀ rule
xCE(ε,h)=m a x
 
0,ε− ¯ εCE(h)
 
. (48)
Plugging (48) into (46) and evaluating it at ε =¯ εCE(h) yields
λ(h)F2(h, ¯ εCE(h)) = μ(h). (49)
Using this result in the second part of (44) delivers the characterization of the equilibrium cutoﬀ levels
F2(h, ¯ εCE(h)) = −1 for all h ∈ H
35which are unique, given the assumptions imposed on F. Wages, consumption and health insurance premia
then trivially follow from (11) and (12).
Proposition 9
Proof. Let Lagrange multipliers to equations (19) and (20) be μ and λ(h), respectively. Then, the ﬁrst
order conditions are:
 
h
u (w(h) − P)Φ(h)=μ
u (w(h) − P)Φ(h)=λ(h)
(1 − g(h))f(ε)[−F2(h,ε − x(ε,h))]λ(h) ≤ μ(1 − g(h))f(ε)Φ(h)
=i f x(ε,h) > 0
g(h)[−F2(h,−x(0,h))]λ(h) ≤ μg(h)Φ(h)
=i f x(0,h) > 0
Thus, oﬀ-corners we have
F2(h,ε − x(ε,h)) = F2(h, ˆ ε − x(ˆ ε,h)) = K
for some constant K and the cutoﬀ rule is determined by
u (w(h) − P)[−F2(h, ¯ εNP(h))] =
 
h
u (w(h) − P)Φ(h). (50)
Moreover, let us take the derivative of (50) with respect to h.
u  (w(h) − P)
∂w(h)
∂h
F2 + u (w(h) − P)
 
F12 + F22
∂¯ εNP(h)
∂h
 
=0
u  (w(h) − P)
∂¯ εNP(h)
∂h
∂w(h)
∂¯ εNP(h)
F2 + u (w(h) − P)
 
F12 + F22
∂¯ εNP(h)
∂h
 
=0
⇒
∂¯ εNP(h)
∂h
 
u  (w(h) − P)F2
∂w(h)
∂¯ εNP(h)
+ u (w(h) − P)F22
 
= −u (w(h) − P)F12
Note that as ¯ ε increases w(h) decreases, since F(h,ε−x(ε,h)) is decreasing for ε<¯ ε, and constant for ε ≥ ¯ ε.
Thus, we have
∂¯ εNP(h)
∂h
> 0.
Proposition 10
Proof. From (21), we immediately obtain
−F2(h, ¯ εNP(h)) =
 
u (w(h) − P)Φ(h)
u (w(h) − P)
< 1¯ εNP(h) < ¯ εSP(h)
=1 ⇒ ¯ εNP(h)=¯ εSP(h)
> 1¯ εNP(h) > ¯ εSP(h)
as −F2(h, ¯ εSP(h)) = 1.
Let us take hL < ˜ h<h H, and suppose
− F2(hL, ¯ εNP(hL)) > 1 > −F2(hH, ¯ εNP(hH)), (51)
i.e.
¯ εNP(hH) < ¯ εSP(hH) ⇒ wNP(hH) >w SP(hH)
¯ εNP(hL) > ¯ εSP(hL) ⇒ wNP(hL) <w SP(hL),
where wSP(h)=g(h)F(h,0) + (1 − g(h))
 
f(ε)F(h,ε − x(ε,h))dε. Then, we have
u NP(c(hH) − P) <u  SP(c(hH) − P) <u  SP(c(hL) − P) <u  NP(c(hL) − P),
36where the second inequality follows from (54). This result, in combination with (51) implies
u NP(c(hL) − P)[−F2(hL, ¯ εNP(hL))] >u  NP(c(hH) − P)[−F2(hH, ¯ εNP(hH))],
a contradiction to (21).
Proposition 13
Proof. Is by backward induction. Trivially eT(h)=0 . In period T, since both policies are in place, the
wage and health insurance premium of every household is independent of h. Thus
vT(h)=u(wT − PT)=vT
and therefore the terminal value function is independent of h. Now suppose for a given time period t the
value function vt+1 is independent of h. Then from the ﬁrst order condition with respect to et(h)w eh a v e
q (et(h)) = βvt+1
 
h 
∂Q(h ;h,e)
∂e
But since for every e and every h, Q(h ;h,e) is a probability measure over h  we have
 
h 
∂Q(h
 ;h,e)
∂e = 0 and
thus et(h,γ) = 0 for all h, on account of our assumptions on q (.). But then
vt(h)=u(wt − Pt)+
 
−0+βvt+1
 
h 
Q(h ;h,0)
 
= u(wt − Pt)+βvt+1 = vt
since
 
h  Q(h ;h,0) = 1 for all h. Thus vt is independent of h. The evolution of the health distributions
follows from (23), and given these health distributions wages and health insurance premia are given by (39)
and (41).
B Further Analysis of the No-Wage Discrimination Case
B.1 Health Insurance Distortions with No-Wage Discrimination
The ﬁrm’s break-even condition is
 
h
 
g(h)F(h,0) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)[F(h,ε − xNP(ε,h))]dε − w(h)
 
Φ(h)=0 ,
and hence on average the production level of a worker will equal his gross wage. Taking εw > 0a n dδ>0
as given, workers for whom the wage limits, maxh,h  |w(h) − w(h )|≤εw, bind will be paid either more or
less than their production level depending on whether the wage discrimination bound binds from above or
below. The ﬁrm will optimally choose to hire less than the population share of any health type h whose wage
is above their production level, and hence some of these workers will be unemployed. Since we have assume
that there is no cost to working and workers pay for their own insurance, competition over health insurance
will lead these workers to increase their health insurance, x(e,h), so that their productivity is within εw of
their wage w(h). In the limit as εw → 0, this implies that
w(h)=g(h)F(h,0) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)[F(h,ε − xNP(ε,h))]dε, (52)
holds and they are fully employed, or w(h) − P(h)=0 . On the ﬂip side, there will be excess demand for
workers whose expected production is more than w(h), they will therefore ﬁnd it optimal to either lower their
insurance, and in the limit as ε → 0 either (52) holds they or set x(e,h) = 0 if they end up at corner with
respect to health insurance. Assuming that neither corner binds, this implies that the no-wage discrimination
policy will be undone by adjustments in the health insurance market. This motivated our assumption that
the government will choose to regulate the health insurance market to prevent this outcome as part of the
no-wage discrimination policy.
37For health types for which the bounds do not bind, market clearing implies that
w(h)=g(h)F(h,0) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)[F(h,ε − xNP(ε,h))]dε
while actuarial fairness implies that
P(h)=( 1− g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)xNP(ε,h))dε.
Hence, an eﬃcient health insurance contract for this type will maximize w(h) − P(h)=wCE(h) − PCE(h).
Since wCE(h) − PCE(h) is increasing in h, it follows that the wage bound binds for the lowest and highest
health types.
B.2 No-Wage Discrimination with Realized Penalties in Equilibrium
Here we assume that the ﬁrm must pay a cost for having wage dispersion conditional on health type or
for having the health composition of its work force diﬀer from the population average. The wage variation
penalty is assumed to take the form
C
 
h
[w(h) − w(0)]
2 n(h),
since health type 0 will have the lowest wage in equilibrium, and where C is the penalty parameter and n(h)
is measure of type h workers the ﬁrm hires. Note that with this penalty function the penalty will apply to
all workers with health h>0.43 The penalty from having one’s composition deviate from the population
average is given by
 
h
D
 
n(h)
 
n(h)
−
Φ(h)
 
Φ(h)
 2
.
Since these penalties are small for small deviations, it will turn out that penalty costs will be realized in
equilibrium. Since both of these penalties are real we need to subtract them from production. We will
assume that there too the government will regulate the insurance market to prevent workers low health
status workers raising their productivity by over-insuring themselves against health risks and high health
status workers lowering their productivity by under-insuring themselves.
We begin analyzing this case by assuming that the penalties for wage discrimination C and hiring dis-
crimination D are both ﬁnite and then we examine the equilibrium in the limit as they become large. The
ﬁrm takes as given the health policy of the worker and the equilibrium wage w(h) and chooses the measure
of each health type to hire n(h) so as to maximize
max
n(h)
 
h
 
g(h)[F(h,−x(0,h)) − x(0,h) ]+( 1− g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)[F(h,ε − x(ε,h)) − x(ε,h)]dε − w(h)
 
n(h)
−C
 
h
[w(h) − w∗)]
2 n(h) −
 
h
 
n(h)
 
n(h)
−
Φ(h)
 
Φ(h)
 2
,
43If we have assumed that the form of the penalty was
C

h
[w(h) − w∗]
2 ψ(h)dh,
where w∗ is the average wage, this would mean that low productivity workers are more costly and less productive, which will
discourage hiring them. Hence, with this form the low productivity workers will only be employed because of the compositional
penalty, which means that the hiring penalty must bind at the margin. Hence the less than average productivity workers will
be in positive net supply in equilibrium, which will complicate the analysis because some of these workers will be employed and
some will not be.
38where w∗ is taken here to mean the lowest wage. Trivially, the ﬁrm will want to hire more than the population
share of any type h for whom
N(h) ≡
 
g(h)[F(h,−x(0,h)) − x(0,h) ]+( 1− g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)[F(h,ε − x(ε,h)) − x(ε,h)]dε − w(h)
 
−C [w(h) − w∗)]
2
is positive and less that the population share if N(h) is negative. Since all ﬁrms share this condition, they
will all choose the same relative shares of each type of worker. Since workers are willing to work so long as
w(h)−P(h) > 0, it follows that w(h) cannot be more than w∗ if N(h) is not positive. To see this note that
there would be excess supply of type h workers and hence the labor market would not clear. Moreover, a ﬁrm
would rather hire a worker of type h at w∗ −ε than for w∗ for ε small. Hence, if w(h)=w∗, then N(h)=0
so long as w∗−P(h) > 0. Hence, for the labor market to clear for each health type, either N(h)=0f o rt y p e
h or N(h) > 0 but w(h) − P(h)=0 . This implies the following proposition.
Proposition 14 If C and D are positive but ﬁnite, and w(h) − P(h) > 0 for all h, then in equilibrium all
households are hired, all ﬁrms are representative, and the wage w(h) is equal to a worker’s productivity less
the cost of paying him.
Since the government can set x(ε,h) = 0 which implies that P(h)=0 , we assume that w(h) − P(h) > 0
for all health types.
B.3 Realized Penalties with Both Policies
Since all that workers care about is their net wage ˜ w(h), which is also equal to their consumption, it follows
that workers are indiﬀerent over contracts that oﬀer combinations of a gross wage w(h) and medical costs
P(h)f o rw h i c h ˜ w(h)=w(h) − P(h) is constant. Hence, it is natural to assume that the ﬁrm takes the
equilibrium net wage function ˜ w(h) as given and chooses the measure of each health type to hire, n(h), and
its health plan, x(ε,h), to solve the following problem
max
n(h),x(ε,h)
 
h
 
g(h)[F(h,−x(0,h)) − x(0,h) ]+( 1− g(h))
  ¯ ε
0
f(ε)[F(h,ε − x(ε,h)) − x(ε,h)]dε − ˜ w(h)
 
n(h)
−C
 
h
[˜ w(h) − ˜ w(0)]
2 n(h) −
 
h
D
 
n(h)
 
n(h)
−
Φ(h)
 
Φ(h)
 2
.
Proposition 15 If C and D are positive but ﬁnite, then in equilibrium all households are hired, all ﬁrms are
representative, the net wage ˜ w(h) is equal to a worker’s productivity less the cost of paying him more than
˜ w(0), and ˜ w(0) = wCE(0) − P(0). The ﬁrm optimally sets x(ε,h)=xCE(ε,h). As C →∞ , ˜ w(h) → ˜ w(0).
Proof. The optimality condition for x(h,ε)i fε =0i s
F(h,−x(0,h)) − 1 ≤ 0
and if ε>0i s
F(h,ε − x(ε,h)) − 1 ≤ 0 w. equality if x(ε,h) > 0.
These are the same conditions as in the competitive equilibrium.
Next, we show that ˜ w(h) has to be increasing in h and hence ˜ w(0) is the lowest paid type. The wage
penalty is w.r.t. to the lowest paid worker type, which we denote by w∗. Given that optimum insurance is the
same as in the competitive equilibrium, it follows that the net earnings per worker is wCE(h)−PCE(h)− ˜ w(h),
and from before wCE(h) − PCE(h) is increasing in h. Hence, for the ﬁrm to break even
 
h
 
wCE(h) − PCE(h) − ˜ w(h)
 
n(h)
− C
 
h
[˜ w(h) − w∗]
2 n(h) −
 
h
D
 
n(h)
 
n(h)
−
Φ(h)
 
Φ(h)
 2
=0 ,
39and the optimality condition for n(h)i s
 
wCE(h) − PCE(h) − ˜ w(h)
 
− C [˜ w(h) − w∗]
2
− D
 
n(h)
 
n(h)
−
Φ(h)
 
Φ(h)
  
1 −
n(h)
 
n(h)
 
1
 
n(h)
=0 .
This condition implies that a ﬁrm will hire more that the population share of any type h for whom
˜ N(h) ≡ wCE(h) − PCE(h) − ˜ w(h) − C [˜ w(h) − w∗]
2 > 0,
and less than the population share if the reverse is true. However any health type h that are not fully
employed in equilibrium would have excess members who would be happy to be hired any positive wage.
Hence, either type h is paid the lowest equilibrium wage or they are fully employed. Hence, any type h for
whom w(h) >w ∗ are fully employed. Any type receiving the lowest wage must be fully employed since the
ﬁrm would be willing to hire more of these workers if we lowered the bottom wage by ε. Since all workers
are fully employed, it follows that all ﬁrms will choose to be representative to avoid the hiring penalty, and
that ˜ w(0) = wCE(0) = w∗ and ˜ w(h) is increasing h. Finally, since the marginal penalty for a deviation in a
type’s net wage from the economy-wide lowest type’s wage is given by
−C [˜ w(h) − ˜ w(0)]
2 ,
and since this cost goes to inﬁnity as C →∞for any positive wage gap, it follows that as C becomes large
˜ w(h) → ˜ w(0), and all of the workers are paid as if they were the lowest health status type and all of their
productivity gap is absorbed by the cost of discriminating on wages. Q.E.D.
The fact that the productivity advantage of higher health status individuals is completely absorbed by
the discrimination costs means that the society as a whole gets no gain from their productivity advantage.
So the health expenditures that raise their productivity above the lowest type are ineﬃcient. In addition,
expenditure on the lowest health type relaxes the wage discrimination penalty on other types. So this
equilibrium outcome is not socially eﬃcient.
C Wages in the Competitive Equilibrium
To understand the implications of proposition 6 for the behavior of equilibrium wages, note that our results
imply that the equilibrium competitive wage is given by
wCE(h)=g(h)F(h,0) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
CE(h)
0
f(ε)F(h,ε − x(ε,h))dε
+(1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
¯ εCE(h)
f(ε)F(h, ¯ εCE(h))dε.
Hence
dwCE(h)
dh
= g (h)
 
F(h,0) −
  ¯ ε
CE(h)
0 f(ε)F(h,ε − x(ε,h))dε
−
  ¯ ε
¯ εCE(h) f(ε)F(h, ¯ εCE(h))dε
 
+g(h)F1(h,0) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
CE(h)
0
f(ε)F1(h,ε − x(ε,h))dε
+(1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
¯ εCE(h)
f(ε)F1(h, ¯ εCE(h))dε
+(1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
¯ εCE(h)
f(ε)F2(h, ¯ εCE(h))
d¯ εCE(h)
dh
dε,
since net eﬀect of the change in the integrand bounds generated by
d¯ ε
CE(h)
dh is zero. Next note that our
optimality condition for ¯ εCE(h), (17), implies that
F12(h, ¯ εCE(h))dh + F22(h, ¯ εCE(h))d¯ εCE(h)=0 ,
40and hence
d¯ εCE(h)
dh
=
−F12(h, ¯ εCE(h))
F22(h, ¯ εCE(h))
.
This result, along with (17), implies that
dwCE(h)
dh
= g (h)
 
F(h,0) −
  ¯ ε
CE(h)
0 f(ε)F(h,ε − x(ε,h))dε
−
  ¯ ε
¯ εCE(h) f(ε)F(h, ¯ εCE(h))dε
 
(53)
+g(h)F1(h,0) + (1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
CE(h)
0
f(ε)F1(h,ε − x(ε,h))dε
+(1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
¯ εCE(h)
f(ε)F1(h, ¯ εCE(h))dε
−(1 − g(h))
  ¯ ε
¯ εCE(h)
f(ε)F2(h, ¯ εCE(h))
F12(h, ¯ εCE(h))
F22(h, ¯ εCE(h))
dε.
All of the terms in (53) are trivially positive except the last, which is negative since F22 < 0. However, so
long as the spillover ratio F12/F22 evaluated at (h, ¯ εCE(h)) is not too negative then, then wages will vary
positive with health status. Note that this is trivially implied if the direct eﬀect of the change in health
status oﬀsets the spillover, or
F1(h, ¯ εCE(h)) − F2(h, ¯ εCE(h))
F12(h, ¯ εCE(h))
F22(h, ¯ εCE(h))
> 0. (54)
Note that this is a condition purely on the fundamentals of the economy since ¯ εCE(h)i sg i v e nb ya n
(implicit) equation that depends only on exogenous model elements. We summarize our results in the
following proposition:
Proposition 16 The competitive wage is increasing in h if (53) is positive.
D Computation of the Social Planner Problem
The idea to solve the problems in (25) is to iterate on sequences {ct,e t(h),Φt(h)}, using the ﬁrst order
condition (26) for the optimal eﬀort choice and the envelope condition (27). To initialize the iterations, note
that
VT(ΦT)=u(cT)
∂VT(ΦT)
∂ΦT(h)
= u (cT) ·
 
g(h)F(h,0) + (1 − g(h))
 
ε
f(ε)
 
F(h,ε − xSP(ε,h)) − xSP(ε,h)
 
dε
 
≡ u (cT) · Ψ(h) (55)
For these expressions we only need to know cT, the term Ψ(h) is just a number that depends on h and is
known once we have solved the static insurance problem. This suggests the following algorithm to solve the
dynamic social planner problem:
Algorithm 17 1. Guess a sequence {ct}T
t=0
2. Determine
∂VT(ΦT)
∂ΦT(h) from (55)
3. Iterate on t to determine {et(h)}
T−1
t=0
(a) For given
∂Vt+1(Φt+1)
∂Φt+1(h ) use (26) to determine et(h).
(b) Use ct,e t(h),
∂Vt+1(Φt+1)
∂Φt+1(h ) and (27) to determine
∂Vt(Φt)
∂Φt(h)
414. Use the initial distribution Φ0 and {et(h)}
T−1
t=0 to determine {Φt}T
t=0 and thus {cnew
t }T
t=0.
5. If {cnew
t }T
t=0 = {ct}T
t=0 we are done. If not, set {ct}T
t=0 = {cnew
t }T
t=0 a n dg ot o1 .
This algorithm is straightforward to implement numerically, since we only have to iterate on the aggregate
consumption sequence, not on the sequence of distributions. In particular, the only moderately costly
operation comes in step 2a) but even there we only have to solve one nonlinear equation in one unknown
(although we have to do it T ∗ card(H) times per iteration).
E Computation of the Equilibrium with a No-Prior-Conditions
Law and/or a No-Wage Discrimination Law
The algorithm to solve this version of the model shares its basic features with that for the social planner
problem, but diﬀers in terms of the sequence of variables on which we iterate:
Algorithm 18 1. Guess a sequence44 {Eu 
t,P t}T
t=0.
2. Given the guess use equations (30)-(33) to determine health cutoﬀs and wages {¯ εNP
t (h),w t(h)}.
3. Given {wt(h),P t}, solve the household dynamic programming problem (34) for a sequence of optimal
eﬀort policies {et(h)}T
t=0.
4. From the initial health distribution Φ0 use the eﬀort functions {et(h)}T
t=0 to derive the sequence of
health distributions {Φt}T
t=0 from equation (23).
5. Obtain a new sequence {Eu new
t ,Pnew
t }T
t=0 from (32) and (33).
6. If {Eu new
t ,Pnew
t }T
t=0 = {Eu 
t,P t}T
t=0 we are done. If not, go to step 1. with new guess {Eu new
t ,Pnew
t }T
t=0.
The algorithm for no-wage discrimination is a slight modiﬁcation of that for no-prior conditions. The
algorithm iterates over {Eu 
t,w t}T
t=0. In Step 1 given the guess use equations (36)-(40) to determine health
cutoﬀs and premia {¯ εNP
t (h),P t(h)}. In Step 4 obtain a new sequence {Eu new
t ,w new
t }T
t=0 from (39) and (38).
With both policies, equation (41) replaces (40) in all expressions.
F Details for Data and Calibration
F.1 Details of the Augmented Model Analysis: Inclusion of the z-shock
We assume that households must incur the cost z, when the z-shock hits. This assumption and the fact that
households are risk averse imply that the z-shock will be fully insured in the competitive equilibrium under
any policy (and of course by the social planner).
Moreover, we assume that households receiving a z-shock can still work, but that their productivity is
only ρ times that of a healthy worker. Therefore, in a competitive equilibrium, the wage of a worker with
health status h is given by
w(h)=g(h)F(h,0) + ρκ(h)F(h,0) + (1 − g(h) − κ(h))
 
F(h,ε − x(ε,h))f(ε)dε
and the health insurance premium is determined as
P(h)=( 1− g(h) − κ(h))
 
x(ε,h)f(ε)dε + μz(h)
Given our assumptions there is no interaction between the z-shocks and the health insurance contract problem
associated with the ε-shock since it is prohibitively costly by assumption not to bear the z-expenditures. The
44Instead of {Eut} one could iterate on {wt(h)} which is more transparent, but signiﬁcantly increases the dimensionality of
the problem.
42role of the z-expenditures is to soak up the most extreme health expenditures observed in the data associated
with catastrophic illnesses, but to otherwise leave our theory from the previous sections unaﬀected.
The static analysis goes through completely unchanged in the presence of the z-shocks. In the dynamic
analysis the beneﬁts of higher eﬀort e and thus a better health distribution Φt(h) now also include a lower
probability κ(h) of receiving a positive z-shock and a lower mean expenditure μz(h)f r o mt h a ts h o c kw i t h
better health h. This extension of the model leads to straightforward extensions of the expressions derived
in the analysis of the dynamic model in section 4, and does not change any of the theoretical properties
derived in sections 3 and 4.
F.2 Descriptive Statistics of the PSID Data
Before we proceed to descriptive statistics of the PSID data, we summarize, in Table 3, the mapping between
variables in our model and data.
Table 3: Mapping between Data and Model
Model Description Data
PSID Variable Actual Data Used
x,μz Medical Expenditure
Average of total expenditure
1997-2002
reported in 1999, 2001, 2003
w Earning
Average of total labor income
1998,2000,2002 reported in 1999, 2001, 2003
h Health Status Self-reported Health in 1997 1997
Since our model period is six years, we take average of reported medical expenditure and wages over six
year periods that we observe. Moreover, we use health status data from 1997 (rather than 1999) to capture
the eﬀect of health on wages and medical expenditure.
Table 4 documents descriptive statistics of key variables from the 1999 PSID data that we use in our
analysis.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables in PSID
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 41 10 23 65
Labor Income 30,170 40,573 0 1,153,588
if Labor Income > 0 32,076 41,097 0.55 1,153,588
Excellent 38,755 55,406 0 940,804
Very Good 32,768 40,351 0 1,153,588
Good 25,516 25,908 0 384,783
Fair 12,605 13,926 0 81,300
Medical Expenditure 1,513 4,624 0 127,815
Excellent 1,234 2,374 0 28,983
Very Good 1,647 5,812 0 127,815
Good 1,486 4,283 0 93,298
Fair 1,792 4,950 0 65,665
Health Status 2.77 0.95 1 4
Physical Activity: fraction(number) of days in a year
Light 0.63 (230.99) 0.39 (142.28) 0 1 (365)
Heavy 0.29 (105.69) 0.35 (126.85) 0 1 (365)
In the PSID, each individual (head of household) self-reports his health status in a 1 to 5 scale, where 1
is Excellent, 2, Very Good, 3, Good, 4, Fair, and 5 is Poor. Even with large number of observations, only
about 1% of total individuals report their health status to be poor. Thus, for our analysis, we will use four
43levels of health status (merge poor and fair together).45 Since PSID reports household medical expenditure,
we control for family size using modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale. 46
As we model working-age population, each household starts his life as a 24 year old and makes economic
decisions until he is 65 years old. Our model time period is 6 years and thus they live for 7 time periods.
We choose six year time period to capture the eﬀect of exercises on health transition. Since exercises tend to
have positive longer-term eﬀects than do medical expenditure, by allowing for a medium-term time period,
we are able to quantify the impact of exercises in a more reliable way.
Data on Health Transitions Table 5 presents the transition matrix of health status over six years. We
see that health status is quite persistent.
Table 5: Health Transition over 6 years
Excellent Very Good Good Fair Total
Excellent 1,286 904 335 92 2,617
49.14 % 34.54 % 12.80 % 3.52 % 100 %
Very Good 482 1,844 1,217 274 3,817
12.63 % 48.31 % 31.88 % 7.18 % 100 %
Good 187 712 1,592 637 3,128
5.98 % 22.76 % 50.90 % 20.36 % 100 %
Fair 36 109 358 957 1,460
2.47% 7.47 % 24.52 % 65.55 % 100 %
Total 1,991 3,569 3,502 1,960 11,022
18.06 % 32.38 % 31.77% 17.78 % 100 %
Physical Activity Data Here, we report some statistics on physical activity.
• Variation of Physical Activity and Its Impact on Health Transition
Density of light and heavy physical activity levels by health are summarized in Figures 15 and 16.
From variations in health evolution by physical activity and initial health status, we ﬁnd that about
30% of variance in health status in the future is explained by health status today, whereas, light and
physical activity explains about 8% and 14%, respectively. Moreover, both initial health status and
light (heavy) exercise explains 46% (41%) of variance in future health outcome.47
• Physical Activity Over Time
Light physical activity has steadily decreased over time, whereas heavy physical activity decreased for
a while, but started increasing in 2005 (Figures 17 and 18).
F.3 Health Shocks, Distribution of Medical Expenditures, and Discussion of
Categorization of Health Shocks
Before going into discussing the medical expenditure distribution in data, we brieﬂy discuss the appropriate
counterparts of data moments for our model. In our model, households do not consume medical care when
they do not get a health shock (although, they can choose not to spend any in case of health shock, since
x∗(h,ε)=m a x {0, ¯ ε(h)}). Therefore, in data, we are interested in the distribution of medical expenditure
conditional on having gotten any health shocks (which we have some information in PSID).
45Labor income and medical expenditure data for fair health in Table 4 include poor (5) in data.
46Each additional adult gets the weight of 0.5, and each child, 0.3.
47From the law of total variance, we know
var(Y )=E(var(Y |X)) + var(E(Y |X)),
where the former is the unexplained and the latter, explained component of the variance.
44Figure 15: Density of Light Physical Activity Figure 16: Density of Heavy Physical Activity
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Light Physical Activity (fraction of days in a year)
F
(
x
)
CDF of Light Physical Activity: 1999 vs. 2009
1999
2009
Figure 17: Light Activity
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Figure 18: Heavy Activity
Table 6 summarizes medical expenditure by shock. Note that all numbers reported are yearly average
taken over six years (1997-2002).
We see that cancer, heart attack, and heart disease incur the most medical expenditure, and thus we
categorize them to be catastrophic shocks (z-shocks). Although the diseases PSID speciﬁcally reports infor-
mation on are those that are common, they are not, by all means, exhaustive of the kind of health diseases
that one can be diagnosed with. And this is hinted when we look at the medical expenditure statistics for
those who report to have missed work due to illness. The maximum amount of medical expenditure they
spend exceeds those of the others, and this might be due to some severe diseases for which they had to be
treated.
Therefore, in addition to cancer, heart attack, and heart disease, we categorize those who have spent
more than their labor income on medical expenditure as having had a catastrophic (z)h e a l t hs h o c k .48 Those
who had a health shock that were not cancer, heart attack, or heart disease, and who spent less than their
income on medical expenditure is considered to have had an ε-shock.49
Figures 19 - 22, plot logs of medical expenditure distribution for all population, for those with ANY
health shock, those with z-shock, and those with ε-shock. By deﬁnition, mean medical expenditure of
z-shock households are higher than those of ε-shock, and so are standard deviations.
48Categorizing catastrophic health shocks using expenditures as percentage of income is not new. There has been discussion
on insuring catastrophic health shocks, and they mostly refer to high amount of expenditure as percentage of income.
49In PSID sample, median of percentage of labor income spent on medical expenditure is 2%, and the mean, 132%. Only
about 5% of households with health shocks spend medical expenditure in excess of their labor income.
45Table 6: Average Medical Expenditure by Health Shock Categories
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All 4,226 1,513 4,624 0 127,815
No Shock 1,419 1,350 4,447 0 101,952
Any Shock 2,807 1,595 4,710 0 127,815
Catastrophic Disease Shock 168 3,745 9,363 0 93,298
Cancer 51 5,210 15,134 0 93,298
Heart Attack 46 3,334 4,705 0 27,161
Heart Disease 94 3,382 5,535 0 38,500
Light Shock 2,767 1,585 4,732 0 127,815
Diabetes 183 2,088 7,196 0 93,298
Stroke 33 2,200 4,905 0 27,161
Arthritis 322 1,684 3,166 0 38,500
Hypertension 566 1,825 6,143 0 93,298
Lung Disease 63 1,705 2,476 0 12,595
Asthma 61 1,135 1,444 0 7,170
Ill 2,351 1,637 5,040 0 127,815
z-shock 297 4,704 12,834 0 127,815
ε-shock 2,510 1,227 2,023 0 32,909
Figure 19: Average Medical Expenditure Distribution Figure 20: Average Expenditure with Health Shock
Figure 21: Average Expenditure w/ z-shock Figure 22: Average Expenditure w/ ε-shock
F.4 Estimation Results
Health Transition Using the functional form described in the main body of the paper, we estimate the
health transition function in the following way.
46Let set of parameters to be estimated be θ =
 
{G(h,h )},δ,φ(h),λ(h),α 1(h),α 2(h)
 
. We use General-
ized Method of Moments to estimate these parameters.
We ﬁrst determine the exercise intervals and assign each individual initial health status and exercise
level bins, k. Using the transition from the data E(qk(h )), we minimize the distance between our estimated
transition function and data, i.e.
θ =a r gm i n
θ
 
1
K
K  
k=1
 
Q(h 
k;θ) − E(qk(h ))
 
 
ˆ W
 
1
K
K  
k=1
 
Q(h 
k;θ) − E(qk(h ))
 
 
,
where K denotes the total number of groups and ˆ W, weighting matrix. Here, we use the eﬃcient weighting
matrix.
With exercise step size of nine,50 we get the following estimated parameter values (h =1 ,2,3,4 corre-
sponds to health being fair, good, very good, and excellent, respectively, i.e. the higher the h the better
one’s health status.).
ˆ G(h,h )=
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
0.8742 0.0927 0.0230 0.0101
0.6597 0.2547 0.0609 0.0249
0.1404 0.3949 0.3442 0.1204
0.0850 0.3170 0.5406 0.0573
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦
δ =1
φ =[ 2 .2796,1.1063,0.5179,8.4123]
λ =[ 0 .3308,0.0193,0.5939,0.1878]
α1 =[ 1 .3274,12.8747,7.0260]
α2 =[ 0 .8035,5.8693]
The estimated transition functions are plotted in Figures 23 - 26. In the ﬁgures, the smoothed functions
are estimated transition, whereas the straight lines represent the data. We see that our functional form ﬁts
the data quite well.
Table 7: Health Shock Probabilities by Health Status
Observations Any Health Shock z Shock ε Shock
1 − g(h) κ(h) 1 − g(h) − κ(h)
All 4,226 0.66 0.07 0.59
Fair 458 0.66 0.21 0.45
Good 1,139 0.71 0.07 0.63
Very Good 1,618 0.68 0.05 0.62
Excellent 1,143 0.60 0.03 0.57
Health Shock Probabilities As seen in Table 7, there are about 7% of households who receive z-shocks
over six years, and the probabilities are decreasing in health status. However, probability of getting any
health shock is not the highest for the Fair health individuals (from Good to Excellent, it is monotone). This
might be due to the fact that given that the health status is already bad, probabilities that one would get
other minor adverse health shocks (ε shocks in the model) are not very high.
Eﬀect of Health Shock on Productivity In Table 8, we summarize working hours and labor income
reported by those with diﬀerent health shock categories.
50The PSID has exercise data from 1999 to 2009. The total number of observations for 6 year transition is 11,022.
470 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Exercise
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
Health Transition of Excellent Initial Health
Fair
Good
V.Good
Excellent
Figure 23: GMM: Transition of Excellent Health
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Figure 24: GMM: Transition of Very Good Health
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Figure 25: GMM: Transition of Good Health
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Figure 26: GMM: Transition of Fair Health
The six year average hours worked of those with z-shocks are about half that of the ones who did not
get any shock (and worked) and they earn about half on average. Therefore, we take ρ =0 .4235, which is
the percentage of labor income earned by those with z-shock, compared to those who have worked and did
not experience any health shock (since we denote earnings of those with z-shock as ρF(h,0)).
Table 8: Hours Worked and Labor Income by Health Shock
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Hours Worked
All 4,226 1,823 856 0 5,300
Positive Hours 3,903 1,974 704 7 5,300
No Shock, Positive Hours 1,259 1,987 781 14 4,732
z-shock 297 998 1,033 0 3,640
ε-shock 2,639 1,892 763 0 5,300
Labor Income
All 4,226 30,171 40,573 0 1,153,588
Positive Hours 3,903 32,362 41,364 0 1,153,588
No Shock, Positive Hours 1,259 32,606 49,358 0 940,804
z-shock 297 13,809 25,470 0 253,560
ε-shock 2,639 31,163 36,883 0 1,153,588
48F.5 Calibration Results
Table 9: Data Targets
Parameters Data Targets
Health Status {hi}i=1,2,3,4 Income of hi relative to h1
log
w(h2)
w(h1)
=0 .2739
log
w(h3)
w(h1)
=0 .4691
log
w(h4)
w(h1)
=0 .5948
Income of Old relative to Yo u n g
log
w(O)
w(Y )
=0 .1114
Production Function A(t,educ) Income in t of less than HS relative to Income of Yo u n gand Fair health
t =1 ,<HS: −0.0042
t =2 ,<HS:0 .1449
t =3 ,<HS:0 .1715
t =4 ,<HS:0 .1980
t =5 ,<HS:0 .0907
t =6 ,<HS: −0.0969
t =7 ,<HS: −0.1112
Income in t of HS Grad relative to Income of Yo u n gand Fair health
t =1 ,HS:0 .2980
t =2 ,HS:0 .4738
t =3 ,HS:0 .5082
t =4 ,HS:0 .5988
t =5 ,HS:0 .6060
t =6 ,HS:0 .5395
t =7 ,HS:0 .2406
φ(a,educ) % Income spent on Med Exp. by Health
E(x|h1)
E(w|h1)
=0 .0525
E(x|h2)
E(w|h2)
=0 .0429
E(x|h3)
E(w|h3)
=0 .0353
E(x|h4)
E(w|h4)
=0 .0308
ξ(a,educ) % Income on Med Exp. by Education and Age(a ∈{ Y,O})
E(x|Y,< HS)
E(w|Y,< HS)
=0 .0386
E(x|Y,HS)
E(w|Y,HS)
=0 .0348
E(x|O,< HS)
E(w|O,< HS)
=0 .0428
E(x|O,HS)
E(w|O,HS)
=0 .0356
49Table 10: Data Targets (continued)
Parameters Data Targets
ε-shock Distribution μ,σε Mean and St.Dev of Agg. Med. Exp. on Light Shocks
E(x)
E(w)
=0 .0362
σ(x)
E(x)
=1 .6462
z-shock Distribution μz(h) % of Income Spent on Catastrophic Shock by Health
E(z|h1)
E(w|h1)
=0 .4664
E(z|h2)
E(w|h2)
=0 .2234
E(z|h3)
E(w|h3)
=0 .1520
E(z|h4)
E(w|h4)
=0 .1261
Exercise Disutility {γ1(educ),γ 2(educ)} Mean and St.Dev of Exercise in t =1
E(et=1)=0 .5735
σ2(et=1)=0 .2828
Measure of Fair and Excellent in t =7
Φt=T(h1)=0 .1944
Φt=T(h4)=0 .1618
Preference Distribution p(γ|educ,h) Mean Exercise in t = 1 by Health
E(et=1|h1)=0 .5030
E(et=1|h2)=0 .5235
E(et=1|h3)=0 .5950
E(et=1|h4)=0 .6087
Mean Exercise by Education in t =1 ,7
E(et=1| <HS )=0 .5303
E(et=1|HS)=0 .5956
E(et=7| <HS )=0 .5517
E(et=7|HS)=0 .6159
Terminal (Marginal) Value {Δ2,Δ3,Δ4} Exercise in the Last Period by Health
E(et=T|h1)=0 .4641
E(et=T|h2)=0 .6092
E(et=T|h3)=0 .6535
50Table 11: Calibrated Parameters
Parameters Description Value Statistics Data Model
h1
Health Status
0.0740 0.2739 0.2897
h2 0.1271 Relative log Wages 0.4691 0.5215
h3 0.1983 in Health and Age 0.5948 0.6191
h4 0.2194 0.1114 0.1066
A(t =1 ,<HS) 1.0472 -0.0042 -0.0042
A(t =2 ,<HS) 2.0529 0.1449 0.1438
A(t =3 ,<HS) 2.3091 0.1715 0.1696
A(t =4 ,<HS) 2.6729 0.1980 0.1986
A(t =5 ,<HS) 1.9297 0.0907 0.0908
A(t =6 ,<HS) 0.7790 -0.0969 -0.0966
A(t =7 ,<HS) Eﬀect of Age, Education 0.6939 Relative log Wages -0.1112 -0.1126
A(t =1 ,HS) on Productivity 2.6970 in Time and Education 0.2980 0.2919
A(t =2 ,HS) 4.0000 0.4738 0.4175
A(t =3 ,HS) 4.4284 0.5082 0.4371
A(t =4 ,HS) 6.6842 0.5988 0.6241
A(t =5 ,HS) 6.8899 0.6060 0.6314
A(t =6 ,HS) 6.0985 0.5395 0.5547
A(t =7 ,HS) 3.2487 0.2406 0.2433
φ(Y,< HS) 0.4727 0.0525 0.0502
φ(O,< HS) 0.4917 0.0429 0.0432
φ(Y,HS) 0.5435 0.0353 0.0342
φ(O,HS) Eﬀect of Med. Exp. 0.6326 % Income on Med.Exp. 0.0308 0.0277
ξ(Y,< HS) on Productivity 0.0103 by Health,Education,Age 0.0386 0.0392
ξ(O,< HS) 0.0050 0.0348 0.0364
ξ(Y,HS) 0.0122 0.0428 0.0427
ξ(O,HS) 0.0085 0.0356 0.0376
με Mean of health shock 0.9239 Mean Medical Expenditure 0.0362 0.0405
σε St. Dev. of health shock 0.1048 St.Dev Medical Expenditure 1.6462 2.0163
μz(h1)
Mean of z-shock
0.3657 0.4664 0.4753
μz(h2) 0.2272 Income spent on 0.2234 0.2211
μz(h3) 0.1974 Catastrophic Shock 0.1520 0.1523
μz(h4) 0.1799 0.1261 0.1259
γ1(<HS ) 0.0024 Mean of Exercise, t =1 0.5735 0.5792
γ2(<HS ) Disutility 0.0928 St.Dev Exercise, t =1 0.2828 0.2761
γ1(HS) by Education 0.0001 Measure of Fair in t = T 0.1944 0.2292
γ2(HS) 0.0984 Measure of Ex. in t = T 0.1618 0.1292
p(γ1| <HS ,h 1) 0.0473 0.5030 0.4961
p(γ1| <HS ,h 2) 0.5015 0.5235 0.5201
p(γ1| <HS ,h 3) 0.1656 0.5950 0.6095
p(γ1| <HS ,h 4) Pop. with γ1 0.3229 Conditional Mean Eﬀort 0.6089 0.6165
p(γ1|HS,h1) by Health,Education 0.0544 by Health, Education 0.5303 0.5375
p(γ1|HS,h2) 0.0712 in t =1 ,7 0.5956 0.5906
p(γ1|HS,h3) 0.5109 0.5517 0.5511
p(γ1|HS,h4) 0.4884 0.6159 0.6192
Δ2 Marginal value of health 0.0015 Conditional Mean Eﬀort 0.4641 0.4937
Δ3 in t = T 2.0313 in t = T 0.6092 0.6041
Δ4 3.1129 0.6535 0.6761
51G Additional Quantitative Results
G.1 Model Fit
Figures 27–30 represent the model ﬁt for average eﬀort of each health level.
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Figure 27: Average Eﬀort: Fair
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Figure 28: Average Eﬀort: Good
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Figure 29: Average Eﬀort: Very Good
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Figure 30: Average Eﬀort: Excellent
52G.2 Policy Implications
Insurance Beneﬁts Tables 12 and 13 present the weighted-averages (across education and exercise pref-
erence) of the cross-subsidies by health level under diﬀerent policy regimes. We measure cross subsidies in
premium by the diﬀerences between the actuarially fair health premium and premium paid under policies;
and cross subsidies in wage by the diﬀerences between the aggregate wage and productivity of the worker
(of a given health level). As discussed in the main text, the negative cross-subsidy implies that the worker
is paying higher premium than the actuarially fair price and/or getting paid less in wages than he produces.
Since under no-prior conditions law, only premium is subsidized, and under no-wage discrimination law,
only wage is subsidized, we report cross-subsidies of premium and wages under each law. The second row
under each health level reports separately the subsidies of premium and wage, under both policies.
Table 12: Cross-Subsidy by Health Level under Diﬀerent Policy Regimes: Young
Health Policy 24–29 30–35 36–41
Prem. Wage Prem. Wage Prem. Wage
Fair
One Policy 0.276 0.285 0.306 0.370 0.290 0.368
Both Policies 0.141 0.247 0.123 0.319 0.111 0.310
Good
One Policy 0.041 0.107 0.014 0.111 -0.012 0.084
Both Policies 0.011 0.102 -0.007 0.096 -0.019 0.066
Very Good One Policy -0.030 -0.029 -0.0850 -0.138 -0.106 -0.199
Both Policies -0.011 -0.026 -0.034 -0.143 -0.045 -0.205
Excellent One Policy -0.071 -0.139 -0.114 -0.269 -0.132 -0.338
Both Policies -0.033 -0.129 -0.054 -0.266 -0.067 -0.338
Table 13: Cross-Subsidy by Health Level under Diﬀerent Policy Regimes:Old
Health Policy
42–47 48–53 54–59 60–65
Prem. Wage Prem. Wage Prem. Wage Prem. Wage
Fair One Policy 0.352 0.481 0.3402 0.470 0.316 0.411 0.245 0.266
Both Policies 0.105 0.411 0.103 0.404 0.104 0.353 0.107 0.214
Good One Policy -0.034 0.094 -0.044 0.080 -0.043 0.064 -0.026 0.033
Both Policies -0.024 0.073 -0.025 0.066 -0.025 0.058 -0.023 0.035
Very Good One Policy -0.151 -0.318 -0.155 -0.333 -0.150 -0.291 -0.121 -0.172
Both Policies -0.050 -0.327 -0.052 -0.337 -0.052 -0.288 -0.051 -0.157
Excellent
One Policy -0.173 -0.505 -0.177 -0.521 -0.173 -0.461 -0.149 -0.291
Both Policies -0.073 -0.507 -0.075 -0.519 -0.075 -0.451 -0.074 -0.267
53Welfare Implications Tables 14 and 15 present the static and dynamic consumption equivalent variations
for each (educ,γ)-groups as well as the aggregates.
(< HS,γL) (< HS,γH) (HS Grad,γL) (HS Grad,γH) Aggregate
Social Planner 2.6341 8.4298 1.6131 7.5427 5.6527
Competitive Equilibrium 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior Conditions Law 1.9557 7.1836 1.1334 5.2777 4.1593
No Wage Discrimination Law 2.4443 7.4681 1.5778 7.2692 5.3486
Both Policies 2.6341 8.4298 1.6131 7.5427 5.6527
Table 14: Welfare Comparisons in Static Economy
(< HS,γL) (< HS,γH) (HS Grad,γL) (HS Grad,γH) Aggregate
Social Planner 7.8120 14.4481 17.1213 17.8447 16.4799
Competitive Equilibrium 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior Conditions Law 5.4108 7.7063 5.8094 7.6374 6.9782
No Wage Discrimination Law 6.4213 8.6671 8.7076 10.6941 9.5399
Both Policies 4.9908 6.7668 8.3978 8.8680 8.1656
Table 15: Welfare Comparisons in Dynamic Economy
Moreover, in Table 16 are the lifetime welfare comparisons in the dynamic economy, conditional on health
and (educ,γ)-group.
Type Policy Fair Good Very Good Excellent
Low Educ, Low γ
Social Planner 45.6618 8.3078 7.3379 2.5327
Comp. Eq. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior 34.3609 6.9402 3.0803 -0.4095
No Wage 34.9972 9.7912 3.1518 -3.5944
Both 46.4916 9.0499 1.0363 -7.0393
Low Educ, High γ
Social Planner 46.4190 9.7199 8.1054 3.1847
Comp. Eq. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior 31.4642 5.7174 1.7938 -1.5060
No Wage 33.8613 9.1959 2.4047 -4.2708
Both 42.5672 6.9865 -1.2339 -9.1102
High Educ, Low γ
Social Planner 69.4954 18.5571 18.0361 14.2185
Comp. Eq 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior 49.3466 13.5551 6.6835 2.3228
No Wage 66.9188 24.0447 11.2267 1.8703
Both 78.9321 25.3647 11.2843 0.7706
High Educ, High γ
Social Planner 62.4530 15.3438 13.7657 9.6096
Comp. Eq. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior 38.6852 8.1877 2.9285 -0.4819
No Wage 52.4471 15.7693 4.0127 -4.5987
Both 60.3707 14.3834 1.4297 -8.1014
Table 16: Lifetime Welfare Comparisons in the Dynamic Economy Conditional on Type and Health
54H Sensitivity Analysis
H.1 Robustness of Results with Respect to Age and Gender
The PSID asks questions on ethnicity51, and among them, we take those who answered to be of a national
origin (47% of the total sample in 1997) to test robustness. We also restrict our sample to males (about
77%) for the second robustness check.
The health transition function and production function related parameters are the key driving forces of
our quantitative results. Therefore, we provide evidence for the similarity in health transition and the labor
earnings over the life cycle between the total population and the subsamples.
For the health transition function Q(h |h,e), we obtain a measure of diﬀerences in the estimated prob-
abilities and the data moments, i.e., χ2 =
 
i=1,N
q
data(h
 i)−Q
est(h
 i)
Qest(h i) , where the qdata(h i)a n dQest(h i)a r e
the actual data and the estimated probability of a worker with initial health status h with exercise level ei52
ending up being health status of h  in the next period. The χ2 value for the health transition is 1.16 and
1.02 for whites and males, where the χ2
49,0.05
53 is 79.
Moments Description All Whites Male
Income by Age of Less than HS
t =1 -0.0042 -0.0892 0.0320
t =2 0.1449 0.2026 0.1214
t =3 0.1715 0.2464 0.1653
t =4 0.1980 0.2901 0.2091
t =5 0.0907 0.0014 0.0183
t =6 -0.0969 -0.3306 -0.1409
t =7 -0.1112 -0.0970 -0.0742
Income by Age of HS Grad.
t =1 0.2980 0.3019 0.2990
t =2 0.4738 0.5867 0.4835
t =3 0.5082 0.6073 0.5522
t =4 0.5988 0.6274 0.6027
t =5 0.6060 0.6500 0.6216
t =6 0.5395 0.5276 0.5366
t =7 0.2406 0.1792 0.3376
% Income Spent on Med. Exp.
Fair 0.0525 0.0573 0.0482
Good 0.0429 0.0428 0.0395
Very Good 0.0353 0.0376 0.0346
Excellent 0.0308 0.0320 0.0290
% Income Spent on Med. Exp Young 0.0386 0.0350 0.0373
by Less than HS Old 0.0348 0.0357 0.0376
% Income Spent on Med. Exp. Young 0.0428 0.0465 0.0495
by HS Grad Old 0.0356 0.0379 0.0447
Table 17: Moments for the Subsample of Population
With regards to the production function, we provide in Table 17, the data moments associated with the
subsamples, in comparison with the full sample. The qualitative features of the moments are similar across
diﬀerent samples: although the absolute numbers for the changes in income over the life-cycle vary in their
levels, the gradients over the life cycle are similar. Thus our quantitative results are robust to restricting
our samples to white and males.
51The exact choices are American (5%); Hyphenated American (e.g., African-American, Mexican-American) (14%); National
origin (e.g., French, German, Dutch, Iranian, Scots-Irish) (47%); Nonspeciﬁc Hispanic identity (e.g., Chicano, Latino) (2%);
Racial (e.g., white or Caucasian, black) (29%) and; 6 Religious (e.g., Jewish, Roman, Catholic, Baptist).
52We divide the population into ﬁve exercise bins, and use them to evaluate the diﬀerences, as we do in our estimation
procedure. The only diﬀerence is that due to the shortage of observations (since we only use half the total sample), instead of
nine bins (in the full model), we use ﬁve bins.
53The degrees of freedom is 49, as the number of observations are 4 × 4 × 5(   Health Today ×   Health Tomorrow ×  
Exercise Bins), and the number of parameters, 30 (80-1-30). Using the full sample, the χ2 value is 0.9986.
55H.2 Beneﬁts of Eﬀort Not Related to Labor Productivity
So far the only beneﬁt of eﬀort e consisted in probabilistically raising health in the future which in turn
impacts positively future wages and health insurance premia. As a result, a combination of both policies
reduces optimal eﬀort to zero, unless a health-dependent terminal continuation utility (as in the quantitative
version of our model) is introduced. We now brieﬂy argue that our main results do not necessarily hinge on
this assumption. Suppose that the net cost of providing eﬀort is given by
γ [q(e) − θe].
Our previous speciﬁcation is a special case with θ =0 , and γθ measures the direct utility beneﬁt from one
unit of exercise. In the absence of any other beneﬁts from exercise (say, from higher wages or lower health
insurance premia), as in the economy with both laws in place, the optimal eﬀort level eBP now solves
q (eBP)=θ
and thus eBP > 0 if and only if θ>0. Thus for a given function q the parameter θ governs the minimal
eﬀort level that each household will provide, and thus a lower bound below which no policy can distort eﬀort
levels.
The equations determining optimal eﬀort levels (equation (26) for the social planner problem and equation
(29) for the competitive equilibrium under the various policies) with preference shocks γ and direct utility
beneﬁts from exercising γθe now become
q (et(h)) = θ +
β
γ
 
h 
∂Vt+1(Φt+1)
∂Φt+1(h )
·
∂Q(h ;h,et(h))
∂et(h)
q (et(h)) = θ +
β
γ
 
h 
∂Q(h ;h,et(h))
∂et(h)
vt+1(h )
and for any given initial health level h, for any preference shock γ a n da n yp o l i c yt h eo p t i m a le ﬀ o r tl e v e li s
simply shifted upwards.
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